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ABSTRACT
In the 1970s, U.S. asset markets witnessed () a 25% dip in the ratio of aggregate household wealth
relative to GDP and () negative comovement of house and stock prices that drove a 20% portfolio
shift out of equity into real estate. This study uses an overlapping generations model with unin-
s u r a b l en o m i n a lr i s kt oq u a n t i f yt h er o l eo fs t r u c t u r a lc h a n g ei nt h e s ee v e n t s .W ea t t r i b u t et h ed i p
in wealth to the entry of baby boomers into asset markets, and to the erosion of bond portfolios
by surprise in ation, both of which lowered the overall propensity to save. We also show that the
Great In ation led to a portfolio shift by making housing more attractive than equity. Apart from
tax e ects, a new channel is that disagreement about in ation across age groups drives up collateral
prices when credit is nominal.
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azzesi@stanford.edu. Schneider: Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford,
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Federal Reserve System.II n t r o d u c t i o n
The 1970s brought dramatic changes in the size and composition of US household sector wealth.
Figure 1 shows that aggregate household net worth as a fraction of GDP fell by 25% during the
1970s, before recovering again to its late 1960s value. Figure 2 shows that the aggregate household
portfolio saw a 20% shift away from equity and into real estate during the 1970s. This portfolio
adjustment was largely driven by negative comovement of asset prices — house prices rose while
equity prices fell, as shown in Figure 3. Compared to the big swings in the major real asset positions,
households’ net position in nominal credit instruments was relatively stable. As documented below,
the stability of net positions masks substantial increases in gross borrowing and lending within the
household sector.
This paper develops an asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets
to study the 1970s. The key elements of the model are that households di er by age and wealth
and that all credit is nominal, so that in ation matters for bond returns and the cost of borrowing.
Our empirical strategy is based on the idea that micro data on household characteristics can be used
to directly parametrize household sector asset demand. In particular, the  rst step of our analysis
is to estimate, for each trading period, () the distribution of income and initial asset endowments
across households and () household expectations about future prices and income. We then determine
optimal household policies given endowments and expectations. Equilibrium prices equate household
asset demand to the supply of assets provided by other sectors. We use this framework to evaluate
di erent candidate explanations for the price and portfolio movements in Figures 1-3.
Our analysis attributes the dip in household wealth to two events unique to the 1970s that
reduced the propensity to save in the household sector. First, entry of the young baby boomers
into asset markets directly lowered the average savings rate. Second, the erosion of bond portfolios
by surprise in ation reduced the ratio of  nancial wealth to human wealth, which also gives rise to
lower savings. Since there was only a small reduction in asset supply in the 1970s, the lower average
savings rate reduced the value of outstanding assets. We also show that the Great In ation induced
a portfolio shift towards real estate. One e ect is that various nominal rigidities in the tax code make
housing more attractive when expected in ation is high. Another e ect we stress is that heterogenous











Figure 1: Aggregate wealth components (market value) divided by GDP, Flow of Funds & own
computations, 1952:1-2003:4.
in ation expectations in a nominal credit market increase the volume of credit and drive up the price
of collateral.
Our model describes a sequence of trading periods. Households of di erent ages enter the period
with di erent initial endowments. They trade goods, as well as three risky assets: equity, real estate
and nominal bonds. In the credit market, households face collateral constraints — all borrowing must
be backed by real estate — as well as a spread between borrowing and lending rates. Moreover,
lending and borrowing is required to be in nominal terms — there is no riskfree asset. Households
experience idiosyncratic shocks to labor income as well as to the value of their real estate holdings.
Neither idiosyncratic risk nor in ation risk are insurable given the available assets.
We implement the model for three 6-year trading periods, highlighted in yellow in Figures 1-3. For
each period, we derive household sector asset demand by solving households’ consumption-savings
problems, given endowments of assets and non-asset income as well as expectations about asset











Figure 2: Aggregate portfolio shares, Flow of Funds & own computations, 1952:1-2003:4.
returns and income in future periods. We then determine asset prices in the trading period by
setting aggregate household demand equal to asset supply, where the latter is de ned as observed
aggregate household asset holdings. Prices thus clear markets to establish a “temporary equilibrium,”
as in Grandmont (1977, 1982). The idea is to view Figures 1-3 as a sequence of temporary equilibria,
of which three are explicitly computed.
Our focus on asset demand and supply in a particular trading period leads us to select the
exogenous “inputs” to our model di erently from existing studies of asset pricing. First, we obtain
estimates of the joint distribution of households’ income and asset endowments — a key determinant
of household asset demand — directly from the Survey of Consumer Finances. These household
characteristics are important for the ratio of  nancial to human wealth and hence for individual
savings rates and risk attitudes. The use of micro data on wealth also provides a new perspective
on the e ect of heterogeneity on asset prices. Existing studies have shown that heterogeneity does











Figure 3: Price-dividend ratio and price-rent ratio, Flow of Funds & own computations, 1952:1-
2003:4.
not matter if asset demand functions are approximately linear over the support of a model-implied
wealth distribution. We examine asset demand in the support of the observed wealth distribution
and  nd that while approximate aggregation obtains within all but the youngest age cohorts, the
distribution of wealth across cohorts does matter.
Second, our approach takes expectations of future prices as an exogenous input. Much of our
analysis is conducted using a baseline set of beliefs derived from historical data. While we do not
force beliefs about future prices to be consistent with the predictions of our model, we do thus
impose consistency with observed price data. Treating expectations as an input is also convenient
for studying their role during the surprising surge of in ation in the 1970s. To capture households’
reaction at the time, we obtain estimates of their forecasts from in ation surveys. We assess the
impact of other dimensions of expectation formation through controlled experiments. In particular,
we consider increases in subjective uncertainty about in ation and a revision in stock return forecasts
4based on measures of expected in ation, motivated by forecasting regressions popularized in the late
1970s.
Although our model is an endowment economy, we allow for di erences between personal income
and consumption, and hence changes in the quantities of assets owned by the household sector. We
identify changes in asset quantities from changes in household positions recorded in the Flow of Funds
Accounts. While we do not model explicitly the decisions of other sectors — such as the government,
businesses and the rest of the world — that give rise to the observed asset supply, our approach
requires that a successful model be consistent with observed savings decisions by households and
observed trades between sectors. In our model, changes in asset supply a ect the sensitivity of the
equilibrium price response to changes in household demand. For example, a reduction in government
debt and an increase in residential investment mitigated the drop in the value of aggregate wealth
and the increase in real estate prices in the 1970s.
We select the discount factor and baseline beliefs so that the model replicates the aggregate
wealth-to-GDP ratio, household sector portfolio weights, as well as the nominal interest rate in 1995.
The baseline model then also matches price dividend ratios of equity and real estate. Moreover,
it captures a number of stylized facts about the cross-section of households in the 1995 SCF. In
particular, it generates hump-shaped cohort market shares in wealth, real estate and equity, as well
as net nominal positions that increase — and real estate shares that decrease — with age and net
worth. The main mechanism behind these facts is that agents who expect more future non-asset
income are willing to build more risky portfolios.
To illustrate the sensitivity of asset prices to changes in expectations and asset supply, we per-
form a series of counterfactuals based on the 1995 calibration. The main result here is that events
relevant to the stock market spill over much less into other asset markets than events relevant to the
housing market, although stock prices are themselves more responsive to changes in expectations.
For example, a one percent increase in real stock return expectations over the next six years raises the
price dividend ratio of stocks by 15%, but raises the nominal interest rate by only 10 basis points;
it lowers the price-dividend ratio on housing by 3.5%. In contrast, a one percent increase in the
expected return on real estate raises the house price by 7%, increases the nominal interest rate by
80 basis points, and also lowers stock prices by 13%. The reason for these results is that households
5can borrow against real estate, so that events in the housing market feed back more strongly to the
credit market than news about stocks.
We then use the model to examine the 1970s. We show that the model produces a drop in
aggregate wealth between 1968 and 1978 for a wide range of expectations scenarios. It attributes
the dip in the wealth-GDP ratio to two e ects. First, the entry of baby boomers into asset markets
lowered the average saving rate. Second, capital losses from realized in ation lowered wealth and
hence savings, especially for older households. At the same time, lower savings were not counteracted
by a large increase in interest rates, because the outside supply of bonds to the household sector also
fell. If we assume that the spread between borrowing and lending rate was 75 basis points higher
in 1968 than in 1995, the model also generates the increase in gross borrowing and lending between
these two years.
We explore three di erent channels through which in ation expectations can induce negative
comovement of stock and house prices. First, households disagreed about in ation in the late 1970s.
We use the Michigan Survey of Consumers to document that old households expected lower in ation
than young households. When credit is nominal, disagreement about in ation implies disagreement
about real interest rates. As a result, there is more borrowing and lending among households and an
increase in the price of collateral, namely housing. Second, nominal rigidities in the taxes code favor
housing over equity in times of high expected in ation. Third, expected in ation is a predictor of
low stock returns (for example, because in ation lowers depreciation allowances based on historical
cost accounting and hence real cash  ows), as shown by a number of studies that appeared in the
1970s, such as Fama and Schwert (1977).
Our quantitative analysis suggests that both in ation and growth expectations were relevant for
asset prices and household positions in the 1970s, while neither can account for the data by itself.
Our model attributes the portfolio shift to changes in in ation expectations. A little more than
half of the shift is due to lower stock returns predicted by higher expected in ation, while about
one quarter each is due to disagreement about real interest rates and nominal rigidities in the tax
code. Disagreement also accounts for the increase in credit volume, which is however mitigated by
an increase in in ation uncertainty. Pessimism about growth, which a ects both labor income and
dividends, increases the demand for savings and partly o sets the e ects of pessimism about stock
6returns on the wealth-GDP ratio. At the same time, pessimism about asset returns puts downward
pressure on interest rates, thus partly o setting the e ects of expected in ation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related literature. Section III
presents the model. Section IV describes the quantitative implementation and documents properties
of the model inputs, that is, the joint distribution of asset endowments and income as well as asset
supply. Section V derives predictions for optimal household behavior and compares them to the
data. Section VI illustrates price determination in temporary equilibrium using counterfactuals.
Section VII derives predictions under baseline expectations and shows that they help understand
the evolution of the wealth-GDP ratio. Section VIII considers the e ect of in ation on portfolio
composition in the 1970s. Section IX concludes.
II Related Literature
Some of the e ects of in ation that arise in our model have been discussed before. Feldstein (1980),
Summers (1981) and Poterba (1991) have examined various ways in which the interaction of taxes
and in ation can a ect asset prices. One argument is that in ation lowers after tax returns on bonds
and stocks more than those on real estate and hence might be responsible for the portfolio shift of the
1970s. We show that this e ect contributes to the portfolio shift, although it cannot quantitatively
generate all of it. These authors have also argued that in ation has e ects on real cash  ows because
of depreciation allowances. These e ects are captured in our pessimism experiments.
Previous literature has shown that demographics cannot account fully for changes in stock prices,
if equity is the only long-lived asset in the model (Abel 2003, Geanakoplos et al. 2004). The e ect
of demographics on house prices in isolation has been considered by Mankiw and Weil (1989) and
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006). In our model, with both equity and real estate present in nonzero
net supply, demographics impact aggregate savings and hence the wealth-GDP ratio, but it can also
not account for the larger movements in the individual components of wealth, especially stocks.
There is a large literature on asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets and/or borrowing constraints. For example, Constantinides and Du e (1996), Heaton and
Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998), Constantinides et al. (2002) and Storesletten et al. (2004)
7consider models with equity, riskless bonds and uninsurable income risk. Alvarez and Jermann (2001)
a n dL u s t i ga n dv a nN i e u w e r b u r g h( 2 0 0 5 )c o n s i d e rm o d e l sw i t hc o m p l e t em a r k e t s ,w h e r ei n c o m er i s k
cannot be insured because of borrowing constraints or collateral constraints backed by real estate,
respectively. The goal of these papers is to derive a stationary equilibrium of the model that matches
empirical moments of returns such as the equity premium. The input to the model is typically
a jointly stationary process for income and dividends, while the output compared to the data are
moments of returns and macro aggregates, and sometimes also the cross section of consumption
(Brav et al. 2002, Kocherlakota and Pistaferri 2005).
Our paper di ers from these studies because of our focus on nominal risk, observed household asset
positions, and structural change. Our empirical implementation uses the cross section of household
asset positions both as an input to the model and as a target of the analysis. To accommodate
structural change, we do not derive a stationary equilibrium that is compared to empirical moments,
but consider instead asset prices and holdings at speci c dates. In this respect, our approach is
similar to that of Barsky (1989) who considers the e ect of lower and more volatile economic growth,
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) who look at the e ect of taxes on stock prices, Nakajima (2005) who
considers the e ect of precautionary savings on house prices and Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) who
study the e ect of credit market deregulation on debt levels. However, existing studies that focus
on low frequency movements in the economy typically compare steady states or stationary equilibria
at di erent parameter values, while we use the temporary equilibrium concept of Grandmont (1977,
1982).
Portfolio choice with housing has been considered by Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Campbell
and Cocco (2003), and Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005). Cocco (2005) and Yao and Zhang
(2005) study intertemporal problems with three assets that are similar to the problem solved by our
households. General equilibrium OLG models with housing have been considered by Chambers et
al. (2006) and Yang (2006). These papers are also interested in the cross section of house ownership.
While they consider a shorter period length and thus study the cross section in more detail than we
do, they abstract from aggregate risk which is important for our application.
8III Model
The model describes the household sector’s planning and asset trading in a single time period .
A. Households
Households enter the period with assets and debt accumulated earlier. During the period, they earn
labor income, pay taxes, consume and buy assets. Labor income is a ected by idiosyncratic income
shocks. Households can invest in three types of assets: long-lived equity and real estate as well as
short lived nominal bonds. Households face two types of aggregate risk. They face aggregate growth
risk through stock dividends and aggregate components of their housing dividends and labor income.
They also face aggregate in ation risk when borrowing or lending because there is no riskfree asset.
Households also face idiosyncratic risk which a ects the return on individual houses and labor income
streams. There are only three assets, so markets are incomplete.
Planning Horizon
Consumers alive at time  di er by endowment of assets and numeraire good as well as by
age. Di erences in age are represented by age-speci c planning horizons  and age-speci c survival
probabilities for the next period. We now describe the problem of a typical consumer with a planning
horizon 0.
Preferences
Consumers care about two goods, housing services and other (non-housing) consumption which
serves as the numeraire. A consumption bundle of  units of housing services and  units of
numeraire yields utility
(1)  = 
1 
 	
Preferences over (random) streams of consumption bundles {} are represented by the recursive


















+ = +	 Here  determines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for deterministic
consumption paths,  is the coe cient of relative risk aversion towards timeless gambles, and  is
the discount factor. The expectation operator takes into account that the agent will reach the next
period only with an age-speci c survival probability.
Equity
Shares of equity can be thought of as trees that yield some quantity of numeraire good as dividend.
Ac o n s u m e re n t e r sp e r i o d with an endowment of ¯ 

   0 units of trees. Trees trade in the equity
market at the ex-dividend price 
; they cannot be sold short. A tree pays 
 units of dividend
at date . We summarize consumers’ expectations about prices and dividends beyond period  by
specifying expectations about returns. In particular, we assume that consumers expect to earn a
(random) real return 
	+1 by holding equity between any two periods  and  +1 ,w h e r e   .
Real Estate
Real estate — or houses — may be thought of as trees that yield housing services. A consumer
enters period  with an endowment of ¯ 


   0 units of houses. Houses trade at the ex-dividend price


 ; they cannot be sold short. To  x units, we assume that one unit of real estate (also referred
to as one house) yields one unit of housing services at date . There is a perfect rental market,
where housing services can be rented at the price 
. Moreover, every house requires a maintenance
cost of  units of numeraire. If a consumer buys 


















Consumers can borrow or lend by buying or selling one period discount nominal bonds. A
consumer enters period  with an endowment of ¯  units of numeraire that is due to past borrowing
and lending in the credit market. In particular, ¯  is negative if the consumers has been a net borrower
10in the past. In period , consumers can buy or sell bonds at a price 	 A consumer expects every
bond bought to pay 1+1 units of numeraire in period  +1 .H e r e +1 is random and may be
thought of as the expected change in the dollar price of numeraire. This is a simple way to capture
that debt is typically denominated in dollars.1 For every bond sold, the consumer expects to repay
(1 + )+1 units of numeraire in period  +1 ,w h e r e0 is an exogenous credit spread.2 Bond
sellers — borrowers — face a collateral constraint: the value of bonds sold may not exceed a fraction 
of the ex-dividend value of all real estate owned by the consumer. For periods  , consumers form





	 They believe that 
	 =1 	 1	 is
the (ex post) real lending rate, and that 
	(1 + ) is the (ex post) real borrowing rate.
Non-Asset Income
Consumers are endowed with an age-dependent stream of numeraire good {	}
+
	=. Here income
should be interpreted as the sum of labor income, transfer income, and income on illiquid assets such
as private businesses.
Budget Set









as well as an
endowment of  + ¯  from non-asset income and past credit market activity. At period  prices,
initial wealth is therefore
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   0 and  
   0 denote the amount of bonds bought and sold,
respectively. It never makes sense for a consumer to borrow and lend simultaneously, that is, +
   0
implies  
 =0and vice versa.
1To see why, consider a nominal bond which costs  dollars today and pays of $1 tomorrow, or 1

+1 units of
numeraire consumption. Now consider a portfolio of 

 nominal bonds. The price of the portfolio is  units of numeraire




+1 =1 +1 units of numeraire tomorrow. The model thus determines the price  of a nominal
bond in $.
2One way to think about the organization of the credit market is that there is a  nancial intermediary that matches
buyers and sellers in period .I np e r i o d+1 the intermediary will collect (1 + )+1 units of numeraire from every
borrower (bond seller), but pay only 1+1 to every lender (bond buyer), keeping +1 for itself. We do not model
the  nancial intermediary explicitly since we only clear markets in period .
11The plan  must satisfy the collateral constraint  




. The plan must also satisfy the
budget constraint
(4)  + 
 +  =¯ ,








    
 	
To formulate the budget constraint for periods beyond , it is helpful to de ne the ex-dividend
value of the consumer’s stock portfolio in  by 
 = 








 as well as the values of a (positive or negative) bond portfolio, +
 = +
 and  
 =  
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	 This plan is selected to maximize
utility (2) subject to the budget constraints (3)-(5) and the collateral constraints.
Taxes
In some of our examples below, we will assume proportional income taxes as well as capital gains
and dividend taxes. This will not change the structure consumer’s problem, just the interpretation
of the symbols. In particular, labor income, dividends and returns will have to be interpreted as
their after-tax counterparts. Their precise form will be discuss in the calibration section below.
Terminal Consumers
The consumers described so far have planning horizons 0. We also allow consumers with
planning horizon  =0 	 These consumers also enter period  with asset and numeraire endowments
that provide them with initial wealth ¯ , as in (3). However, they do not make any savings or
12portfolio decisions. Instead, they simply purchase numeraire and housing services in the period 




To capture consumer heterogeneity, we assume a  nite number of consumer types, indexed by ,w i t h





 ()  ()+¯  ()) and planning horizons  ()	
The Rest of the Economy
To close the model and regulate the supply of assets exogenous to the household sector, we
introduce a rest-of-the-economy (ROE) sector. It may be thought of as a consolidation of the business
sector, the government and the rest of the world. The ROE sector is endowed with 
 trees and 


houses in period .H e r e 
 could be negative to represent repurchases of shares by the corporate
sector. In addition, the ROE enters period  with an outstanding debt of ¯   units of numeraire, and











)+!   ¯  	
If 
 is positive, it is consumed by the ROE sector. More generally, the ROE is assumed to have
“deep pockets” out of which it pays for any de cit if 
 " 0.
Aggregate Asset Supply





 ()=  ¯ 

 ()=1 	
In addition, we assume that initial endowments from past credit market activity are consistent, in
the sense that every position corresponds to some o setting position, either by a household or by the
ROE sector:
¯ ()= ¯  	
13Equilibrium
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 ()  
 ()} such that






given consumer 0 endowment, planning horizon, and expectations about future prices and
returns;
(2) markets for all assets and goods clear:

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In addition to market clearing conditions for stocks, bonds and numeraire, there are two market
clearing conditions for housing: one for the asset “real estate” and one for the good “housing services”.
The  rst equation ensures that the total demand for houses equals their total supply. The  fth
equation ensures that the fraction of houses that owners set aside as investment real estate — that
is, selling services in the rental market — is the same as the fraction of housing services demanded in
the rental market. As is common in competitive models, one of the  ve market clearing conditions is
redundant, as it is implied by the sum of consumers’ budget constraints, the de nition of 
 and
the other four market clearing conditions. Solving for equilibrium prices thus amounts to solving a
system of four equation in the four prices 

 , 
,  and 
.
14C. Discussion of the Assumptions
Connection to National Income Accounting
Introducing the ROE sector allows us to accommodate deviations between consumption and
household sector income that are usually ignored in endowment economy models. To clarify the















 +( 1   1) ¯  	
| {z }
personal consumption personal savings personal income
The  rst term on the left-hand side of this equation is personal consumption, including housing
services. The right-hand side of this equation represents personal income. While our de nition of
income di ers from the NIPAs in some details, as discussed in the next section, the basic components
are the same: non-asset income, dividends on the two long-lived assets, and net interest. The
di erence between personal consumption and income is the second term on the left-hand side, which
represents personal savings. It consists of the same components as in the FFA: net acquisition of real
estate and net acquisition of  nancial assets, here equity and bonds.3 The supply of assets provided
by the ROE thus allows for positive or negative personal savings in equilibrium.
Asset Supply and Savings
The possibility of nonzero savings makes our model compatible with richer models that explicitly
consider production,  scal policy, and the fact that the US is not a closed economy. A richer model
would give rise to well-founded policy functions for the business, government, and foreign sectors that
link those sectors’ net asset supplies to market prices. At the same time, if the richer model accounts
for observed supply by the ROE sector to the household sector, evaluating the policy functions at
observed prices should deliver observed quantities. In our empirical implementation below, we thus
set the net supply by the ROE equal to observed quantities.
3FFA savings is larger than our concept of savings because FFA investment contains investment in noncorporate
business, as well as purchases of consumer durables. In our empirical implementation, noncorporate business is treated
as illiquid and investment in it is subtracted from income. In addition, we follow the NIPA convention of treating
expenditure on durables as consumption. This seems appropriate given the 6-year length of each period in our model.
15We thus determine asset prices such that households are willing to hold observed quantities,
which would also be provided by the ROE in a well-working richer model. In a model where the
other side of the market is also derived from optimal policies, the household sector could be modelled
i ne x a c t l yt h es a m ew a ya si no u rm o d e l . 4 Hereby, we avoid a common criticism of asset pricing
models based on endowment economies: model features that help explain prices in an endowment
economy — for example, certain preference speci cations — may entail undesirable outcomes once
savings are allowed. Our strategy matches simultaneously prices and observed household savings.
Prices vs. Quantities
It is not common in endowment economy models to distinguish asset prices and quantities. Indeed,
if the dividend from a single “tree” provides all consumption, there is no meaningful concept of
quantity — doubling the quantity of trees is the same as doubling the dividend on the single tree. In
our model, asset quantity is identi ed because we allow trades between the household sector and the
ROE. Households increase or decrease the quantity of trees they own only through such trades. The
change in quantity is determined by comparing the change in market capitalization with the capital
gain on pre-existing trees. While a capital gain is enjoyed by households who enter the periods
owning trees, a change in capitalization requires households to pay for new trees.
Temporary Equilibrium
Temporary equilibrium does not place restrictions on prices beyond date  itself. In particular,
it does not require that agents agree on a common model structure that links future fundamentals
and prices. As far as household behavior is concerned, our empirical implementation instead follows
the literature on portfolio choice, where exogenous processes for returns and income are standard.
However, we go beyond portfolio choice models in that we explore how equilibrium prices change
when investors’ expectations about returns vary in a controlled way. This is particularly useful if
expectations are matched to in ation surveys, as we do in Section VIII, since expected in ation
directly a ects returns.
4Our modelling strategy requires some care in interpretating counterfactuals. For example, computing the response
to a change in tax rates cannot tell us what would have happened to the economy as a whole, since we do not model
supply responses to tax changes. Instead, the counterfactual tells us what the household sector would have done if
taxes changed, and what the e ect on prices would have been had supply remained unchanged. The reason the exercise
is still useful is that it allows us to see whether tax changes can play a  rst order role in accounting for asset prices
over time, given the actual movements in equilibrium quantities.
16Our model does not link price expectations to future model-implied prices. Such a connection is
imposed in rational expectations models, and more generally whenever agents have “structural knowl-
edge” of the price function, such as in many models with Bayesian learning. Assuming structural
knowledge has appeal when agents understand well how the economy works, for example because
there are stable recurrent patterns in the data. Indeed, in a stationary environment, “knowing the
price function” can be justi ed by learning from past data, and appears no more restrictive than
“knowing the distribution of fundamentals.”
However, our interest in this paper is in low frequency asset-price movements during times of
structural change. In this context, it is not clear why agent beliefs should be based on the particular
model structure that we consider today with the bene t of hindsight. For example, it is not clear
whether household expectations should be required to anticipate structural change that we only now
know to have taken place. Since the usual justi cations for narrowing down the set of expectations
by imposing rational expectations or structural knowledge is not compelling, we turn to  exible
modelling of exogenous expectations.
Connection to consumption-based asset-pricing
Many studies that examine asset prices jointly with real variables focus on consumption, in
particular the connection between consumption and asset prices implied by intertemporal Euler
equations. Since our model is based on utility maximization, an Euler equation also holds, at least
at the individual household level. Instead of considering temporary equilibria, thus deriving a map
from endowments and supply to prices, one could consider examining the Euler equation directly. In
certain ways this might be easier, since it requires only one non-price variable, consumption, although
serious treatment of heterogeneous agents would require household-level consumption data.
The main problem with the Euler equation approach in our context is that the Euler equation
relates prices to investors’ planned consumption, and thus makes sense only if planned consumption
can be measured. Imposing rational expectations e ectively makes the (subjective) distribution of
planned consumption measurable by setting it equal — by assumption — to the observed distribution
of realized consumption. As discussed above, this is a strong assumption that is not compelling in
the context of structural change. As a result, the Euler equation approach itself is not appealing for
t h ea p p l i c a t i o nw ec o n s i d e ri nt h i sp a p e r .
17T a b l e1 :N e g a t i v eN e tW o r t hH o u s e h o l d s
1962 SCF 1995 SCF 2001 SCF
avg. 29 53 77 avg. 29 53 77 avg. 29 53 77
%o fh o u s e h o l d s 4% 10% 3% 2% 7% 18% 4% 2% 7% 20% 5% 2%
net worth (in $) -.4K -.4K -.8K -1.3K -9K -9K -13K -8K -11K -10K -9K -1K
Note: Row 1 reports the percentage of households with negative net worth in the U.S.
population based on di erent SCFs. Row 2 reports the average net worth of these house-
holds in dollars.
Nonnegative Net Worth
Few households have negative net worth. Table 1 documents that the percentage of negative
net worth households has always been between 4% and 7%. Table 1 also shows that the net worth
of these households is moderate. For example, the average net worth was -11K Dollars in 2001.
These numbers suggest that the most important reason for household borrowing is not consumption
smoothing. Instead, young households “borrow to gamble” – they borrow to be able to buy more
risky assets, such as housing.
The Role of Housing
In both our model and in reality, housing plays a dual role: housing can be used for consumption
and investment. In its role as consumption good, housing is di erent from other consumption,
because it enters the utility function separately and has a di erent price 
	 I ni t sr o l ea sa s s e t ,
housing is di erent from other assets, because of its return properties (which will be discussed later),
and because it can serve as collateral. In reality, the two roles are often connected, because the
amount of housing services consumed is equal to the dividend paid by the amount of housing held
in the portfolio. In our model, we abstract from this issue (at least for now) for several reasons.
First, most homeowners not only own their primary residence, but also some investment real estate
(such as time shares, vacation homes, secondary homes, etc.). Hence, there is no tight link between
consumption and investment for these households. Second, U.S. households are highly mobile. As a
consequence, houses are owned by the same owner on average for only seven years, which is roughly
the same length as a period in our model. Moreover, the decision to move is often more or less
exogenous to households (for example, because of job loss, divorce, death of the spouse, etc.).
18IV Quantitative Implementation
The inputs needed for implementing the model are () the joint distribution of asset endowments and
income, () aggregate supply of assets to the household sector from other sectors, () expectations
about labor income and asset returns and (#) parameter values for preferences and the credit market.
We describe our choices in detail in the Appendix; here we provide a brief overview. We start with
a description of what a model period corresponds to in the data.
Timing
The length of a period is six years. Since the model compresses what happens over a six year
span into a single date, prices and holdings are best thought of as period averages. We assume
that consumers expect to live for at most 10 such periods, where the  rst period of life corresponds
roughly to the beginning of working life. In any given period, we consider 11 age groups of households
("23, 24-29, 30-35, 36-41, 42-47, 48-53, 54-59, 60-65, 66-71, 72-77, 77) who make portfolio choice
decisions. For ease of comparison with other models, we nevertheless report numbers at annual rates.
In the time series dimension, we focus on three six-year periods, namely 1965-70, 1975-80, and
1992-97. To construct asset endowment distributions, we use data on asset holdings from the respec-
tive precursor periods 1959-64, 1969-74, and 1986-91. Micro data is not available at high frequencies.
To capture the wealth and income distribution during a period, we have chosen the above intervals
so that every period that contains a Survey of Consumer Finances contains it in the 4th year of the
period; we thus use surveys from 1962, 1989 and 1995. We use the 4th year survey to infer income
and asset holdings where possible.
A. De ning Assets and Income
We map the three assets in the model to three broad asset classes in US aggregate and household
statistics. For equity and real estate, we use the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) to derive measures
of () aggregate holdings of the household sector, () net purchases by the household sector and ()
aggregate dividends received by the household sector. We use the numbers on value, dividends and
new issues to calculate price dividend ratios and holding returns on equity and real estate. For both
19assets, we also de ne corresponding measures at the individual level using the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF).
Equity
We identify equity with shares in corporations held and controlled by households. We include
both publicly traded and closely held shares, and both foreign and domestic equity. We also include
shares held indirectly through investment intermediaries if the household can be assumed to control
the asset allocation (into our broad asset classes) himself. We take this to be true for mutual funds
and de ned contribution (DC) pensions plans. We do not include equity in de ned bene t (DB)
pension plans, since households typically do not control the asset allocation of such funds. Our
concept of dividends thus equals dividends received by households from the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) less dividends on household holdings in DB plans.
Real estate
Our concept of residential real estate contains owner-occupied housing, directly held residential
investment real estate, as well as residential real estate recorded in the FFA/NIPA as held indirectly
by households through noncorporate businesses. This concept contains almost all residential real
estate holdings, since very few residential properties are owned by corporations. We take housing
dividends to be housing consumption net of maintenance and property tax from NIPA. For net
purchases of new houses, we use aggregate residential investment from NIPA.
The ROE sector endowment of equity consists of net new equity purchased by the household sector
during the trading period. The factor  states this endowment relative to total market capitalization
in the model. We thus use net purchases of corporate equity divided by total household holdings
of corporate equity. The ROE sector endowment of residential real estate consists of residential
investment, divided by the value of residential real estate. The top panel of Figure 4 plots quarterly
series for both ROE endowment, or “asset supply” numbers. The calibration of the model uses
six-year averages of these series.
Nominal positions
Our concept for a household’s bond holdings is its net nominal position, that is, the market value
of all nominal assets minus the market value of nominal liabilities. As for equity, holdings include
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Figure 4: Top panel: Net new corporate equity as a percent of total household holdings of corporate
equity and residential investment as percent of value of residential real estate. Data are quarterly at
annual rates. Bottom panel: Net nominal position of household sector as a percent of GDP.
not only direct holdings, but also indirect holdings through investment intermediaries. To calculate
market value, we use the market value adjustment factors for nominal positions in the U.S. from
Doepke and Schneider (2006). In line with our treatment of tenant-occupied real estate, we assign
residential mortgages issued by noncorporate businesses directly to households.
When considering gross nominal positions, we must take into account the fact that some netting
of positions occurs at the individual level. A typical household will have both a mortgage loan or
credit card and a savings account or bonds in a pension fund. However, the model has only one type
of nominal asset, and a household can be either long or short that asset. If we were to match the
gross aggregates from the FFA or SCF in our model, this would inevitably lead to net positions that
are too large. Instead, we sort SCF households into borrowers and lenders, according to whether
their net nominal position is negative or not. The numbers for gross borrowing and lending are then
calculated as minus the sum of net nominal positions of borrowers as well as the sum of net positions
21of all lenders, respectively.
Table 2 summarizes these gross nominal positions after individual netting from the SCF and
compares them to those in the FFA. Both the FFA numbers and our estimates re ect a steady
increase in borrowing by the household sector. At the same time, both sets of numbers show a
reduction in nominal asset holdings in the 1970s followed by an increase between 1978 and 1995.
Throughout, individual netting reduces gross lending by roughly one third, while it reduces gross
borrowing by slightly more than half.
Table 2: Gross Borrowing and Lending (%GDP)
1968 1978 1995
lending borrowing lending borrowing lending borrowing
FFA aggregates 88 47 84 51 107 68
SCF after indiv. netting 61 20 56 23 70 31
The initial nominal position of the ROE sector is taken to be minus the aggregate (updated)
net nominal position of the household sector. Finally, the new net nominal position of the ROE in
period  — in other words, the “supply of bonds” to the household sector — is taken to be minus the
aggregate net nominal positions from the FFA for period . This series is reproduced in the bottom
panel of Figure 4.
Non-Asset Income
Our concept of non-asset income comprises all income that is available for consumption or invest-
ment, but not received from payo s of one of our three assets. We construct an aggregate measure of
such income from NIPA and then derive a counterpart at the household level from the SCF. Of the
various components of worker compensation, we include only wages and salaries, as well as employer
contributions to DC pension plans. We do not include employer contributions to DB pension plans
or health insurance, since these funds are not available for consumption or investment. However, we
do include bene ts disbursed from DB plans and health plans. Also included are transfers from the
government. Finally, we subtract personal income tax on non-asset income.
22B. The joint distribution of asset endowments and income
Consumers in our model are endowed with both assets and non-asset income. To capture decisions
made by the cross-section of households, we thus have to initialize the model for every period  with a
joint distribution of asset endowment and income. We derive this distribution from data on terminal
asset holdings and income in the precursor period  1. To handle multidimensional distributions, we
approximate them by a  nite number of household types. Types are selected to retain key moments
of the full distribution, in particular aggregate gross borrowing and lending.
Since the aggregate endowment of long-lived assets is normalized to one, we can read o  the
endowment of a household type in period  from its market share in period  1	 F o re a c hl o n g - l i v e d
asset  = $ %,s u p p o s et h a t
 1 () is the market value of investor ’s position in    1 in asset 	
















= market share of household  in period    1	
For nominal assets, the above approach does not work since these assets are short-term in our
model. Instead, we determine the market value of nominal positions in period  1 and update it to
period  by multiplying it with a nominal interest rate factor:















Letting & denote real GDP growth and ! the aggregate net nominal position as a fraction of
GDP, we have
 ()   

 1 ()! 1 (1 +  1   &   )	
This equation distinguishes three reasons why ¯  () might be small in a given period. The  rst is sim-
ply that the household’s nominal investment in the previous period was small. Since all endowments
are stated relative to GDP, all current initial nominal positions are also small if the economy has
23just undergone a period of rapid growth. Finally, initial nominal positions are a ected by surprise
in ation over the last few years. If the nominal interest rate  1 does not compensate for realized
in ation ,t h e n

 is small (in absolute value). Surprise in ation thus increases the negative position
of a borrower, while it decreases the positive position of a borrower.
The  nal step in our construction of the joint income and endowment distribution is to specify
the marginal distribution of non-asset income. Here we make use of the fact that income is observed
in period    1 i nt h eS C F .W et h e na s s u m et h a tt h et r a n s i t i o nb e t w e e n   1 and  is determined
by a stochastic process for non-asset income. We employ the same process that agents in the model
use to forecast their non-asset income, described in Appendix B. This approach allows to capture
the correlation between income and initial asset holdings that is implied by the joint distribution of
income and wealth.
Distributions for 1968, 1978 and 1995
Figure 5 provides summary information on asset endowment and income distributions in the three
trading periods we consider below. The trading periods are identi ed in the  gure by their respective
fourth year: 1968, 1978 and 1995. The top left panel provides population weights by cohort. Cohorts
are identi ed on the horizontal axis by the upper bound of the age range. In addition, the fraction
of households that exit during the period are o set to the far right.
The di erent years can be distinguished by the line type: solid with circles for 1968, dashed with
squares for 1978 and dotted with diamonds for 1995. Using the same symbols, the top right panel
shows house endowments (light lines) and stock endowments (dark lines) by age cohort, while the
bottom left panel shows initial net nominal positions as a percent of GDP. Finally, the bottom right
panel shows income distributions. Here we plot not only non-asset income, but also initial wealth
not invested in long-lived assets, in other words,








 +¯  + 	
This aggregate will be useful to interpret the results below.
Two demographic changes are apparent from the  gure. First, the baby boom makes the two
youngest cohorts relatively larger in the 1978 cross section than in the other two years. By 1995, the
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Figure 5: Asset endowment and income distributions in 1968, 1978 and 1995. Top left panel:P o p u l a -
tion weights by cohort, identi ed on the horizontal axis by the upper bound of the age range. Exiting
households during the period are on the far right. Top right panel: House endowments (light lines)
and stock endowments (dark lines) by age cohort. Bottom left panel: initial net nominal positions as
a percent of GDP. Bottom right panel: Income distributions.
boomers have aged so that the 42-47 year olds are the now strongest cohort. This shift of population
shares is also re ected in the distribution of income in the bottom right panel. Second, the relative
size of the oldest group has become larger over time. Recently, a lot of retirement income comes
from assets, so that the share of  of the elderly groups has also increased a lot. A key di erence
between the 1968 and 1978 distributions is thus that the latter places more weight on households
who tend to save little: the oldest and, especially, the youngest. While the 1995 distribution also has
relatively more weight on the elderly, it emphasizes more the middle-aged rather than the young.
25The comparison of stock and house endowments in the top right panel reveals that housing is
more of an asset for younger people. For all years, the market shares of cohorts in their thirties
and forties are larger for houses than for stocks, while the opposite is true for older cohorts. By
and large, the market shares are however quite similar across years. In contrast, the behavior of net
nominal positions relative to GDP (bottom right hand panel) has changed markedly over time. In
particular, the amount of intergenerational borrowing and lending has increased: young households
today borrow relatively more, while old households hold relatively more bonds.
C. Expectations and Preference Parameters
A baseline set of beliefs for returns and non-asset income is derived in Appendix B. We assume that
consumers believe real asset returns and aggregate growth to be serially independent over successive
six year periods. Moreover, consumers believe that returns and growth are identically distributed
for periods beyond  +1 .5 To pick numbers, we start from empirical moments of six-year ex-post
pre-tax real returns on  xed income securities, residential real estate and equity, as well as in ation
and growth. Since returns on individual properties are more volatile than those on a nationwide
housing index, we add an idiosyncratic shock to the house return faced by an individual household.
We also specify a stochastic process for after-tax income. Brie y, the functional form for this
process is motivated by existing speci cations for labor income that employ a deterministic trend to
capture age-speci c changes in income, as well as permanent and transitory components. We also
use estimates from the literature to account for changes in the volatility of the di erent components
over time.
As for preference parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is  = 	5 the coe cient
of relative risk aversion is  =5and the discount factor is  =e x p (  0	025 × 6).S i n c e  is low,
agents do not want to hold bonds when faced with historical Sharpe ratios on stocks and housing.
To avoid this counterfactual implication, we assume that agents view long-lived assets as riskier than
indicated by their historical moments. This idea of “low aversion against high perceived risk” can be
captured by scaling the historical return variances from Table B.2 with a  xed number. This scaling
5In most of the exercises below, we allow beliefs for returns between  and  +1to di er from baseline beliefs, so
that returns are not iid. We discuss the latter aspect of beliefs below when we present our results.
26can be interpreted as a consequence of Bayesian learning about the premium on equity and housing.
We select a factor of 3, which leads to match the aggregate portfolio weights for 1995 reported in
Table 3 almost exactly.
Table 3: 1995 Data and Baseline Beliefs
experiment wealth/ portfolio weights lend./ borr/ PD ratios interest rate
GDP bonds housing stocks GDP GDP housing stocks nominal
(1) –1995 data – 2.51 .15 .59 .26 .70 .31 20.4 23.9 .061
(2) baseline 2.51 .15 .60 .25 .70 .31 20.8 22.7 .061
Note: The  rst row reports the aggregate portfolio weights on bonds, housing and stocks from
Figure 2; the gross borrowing and lending numbers from Section A., the wealth-to-GDP ratio
from Figure 1; the price-dividend ratios for housing and stocks together with the nominal 6-year
interest rate. The second row report the results computed from the model for 1995 with baseline
beliefs.
An alternative strategy would be to work with agents who have “high aversion against low
perceived risk.” In this case, agents base their portfolio choice on the historical variances from Table
B.2, but are characterized by high risk aversion,  =2 5 , and high discounting,  =e x p(  0	07 × 6).
The high  is needed to lower the portfolio weight on bonds, while the low  is needed to reduce the
precautionary savings motive in the presence of uninsurable income shocks. While the tables below
report results based on agents with “low aversion against high perceived risk,” we would get results
comparable to those in Table 3 based on this alternative parametrization.6
D. Taxes and the Credit Market
I tr e m a i n st os e l e c tp a r a m e t e r st oc a p t u r et a x e so ni n v e s t m e n ta sw e l la sc o n s u m e r s ’o p p o r t u n i t i e s
for borrowing. For the year 1995, we assume a 2% per year spread between borrowing and lending
interest rates. Early on, credit markets were less developed and gross credit was thus smaller. To
capture this, we set the spread to 2.75% for the earlier years. In addition, we select the borrowing
6Yet another way to obtain realistic aggregate portfolio weights is to combine low risk aversion with  rst-time
participation costs, as shown by Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
27constraint parameter  = 	8	 This implies a maximal loan-to-value ratio of 80%, where “value” is the
ex-dividend value of the house.
Investors care about after-tax real returns. In particular, taxes a ect the relative attractiveness of
equity and real estate. On the one hand, dividends on owner-occupied housing are directly consumed
and hence not taxed, while dividends on stocks are subject to income tax. On the other hand, capital
gains on housing are more easily sheltered from taxes than capital gains on stocks. This is because
many consumers simply live in their house for a long period of time and never realize the capital
gains. Capital gains tax matters especially in in ationary times, because the nominal gain is taxed:
the e ective real after tax return on an asset subject to capital gains tax is therefore lower when
in ation occurs.
To measure the e ect of capital gains taxes, one would ideally like to explicitly distinguish realized
and unrealized capital gains. However, this would involve introducing state variables to keep track
of past individual asset purchase decisions. To keep the problem manageable, we adopt a simpler
approach: we adjust our benchmark returns to capture the e ects described above. For our baseline
set of results, we assume proportional taxes, and we set both the capital gains tax rate and the
income tax rate to 20%. We de ne after tax real stock returns by subtracting 20% from realized net
real stock returns and then further subtracting 20% times the realized rate of in ation to capture
the fact that nominal capital gains are taxed. In contrast, we assume that returns on real estate are
not taxed.
V Household Behavior
In this section, we consider savings and portfolio choice in the cross section of households. We focus
on baseline beliefs for 1995, the year we have used to calibrate beliefs. The initial distribution of
asset endowments and income is derived from the 1989 SCF, as discussed in Section IV. We  rst
present optimal policies as functions of wealth and income. We then compare the predictions of the
model for the cross-section of households in 1995 to actual observations from the 1995 SCF.
28A. Lifecycle Savings and Portfolios
Since preferences are homothetic and all constraints are linear, the optimal savings rate and portfolio
w e i g h t sd e p e n do n l yo na g ea n dt h er a t i oo fi n i t i a lw e a l t h¯  — de ned in (3) above as asset wealth
plus non-asset income — to the permanent component of non-asset income, say ˆ . For simplicity,
we refer to ¯ ˆ  as the wealth-to-income ratio. Figure 6 plots agent decisions as a function of this
wealth-to-income ratio.
Savings
The bottom right panel shows the ratio ¯  of terminal wealth to initial wealth, that is, the
savings rate out of initial wealth. Savings are always positive, since the borrowing constraint precludes
strategies that involve negative net worth. Investors who have more income in later periods than in
the current period thus cannot shift that income forward by borrowing. In this sense, there is no
borrowing for “consumption smoothing” purposes: all current consumption must instead come out
of current income or from selling initial asset wealth.
If initial wealth is very low relative to income, all assets will be sold and all income consumed, so
that the investor enters the next period with zero asset wealth. As initial wealth increases, a greater
fraction of it is saved for future consumption. In the absence of labor income, our assumption of
serially independent returns implies a constant optimal savings rate. As wealth becomes large relative
to the permanent component of income, the savings rate converges to this constant.
The bottom right panel also illustrates how the savings rate changes with age. There are two
relevant e ects. On the one hand, younger investors have a longer planning horizon and therefore
tend to spread any wealth they have over more remaining periods. This e ect by itself tends to make
younger investors save more. On the other hand, the non-asset income pro le is hump-shaped, so
that middle-aged investors can rely more on labor income for consumption than either young or old
investors. This tends to make middle-aged investors save relatively more than other investors.
The  rst e ect dominates when labor income is not very important, that is, when the wealth-
to-income ratio is high. The  gure shows that at high wealth-to-income ratios, the savings rate of
the 29-35 year old group climbs beyond that of the oldest investor group. It eventually also climbs
below the savings rate of the 48-53 year old group. The second e ect is important for lower wealth-
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Figure 6: Asset holdings and terminal wealth, both as fractions of initial wealth, plotted against the
initial wealth-to-income ratio. Age groups are identi ed by maximum age in the cohort.
to-income ratios, especially in the empirically relevant range around 1-2, where most ratios lie in the
data. In this region, the savings rate of the middle-aged is highest, whereas both the young and the
old save less. Among the latter two groups, the young save the least when their wealth-to-income
ratio is low.
Borrowing and Leverage
Rather than enable consumption smoothing, the role of borrowing in our model is to help house-
holds construct leveraged portfolios. The bottom left panel of Figure 6 shows that investors who
are younger and have lower wealth-to-income ratios tend to go short in bonds. The top panels show
that the borrowed funds are used to build leveraged positions of houses and also stocks. In contrast,
investors who are older and have higher wealth-to-income ratios tend to go long in all three assets.
Along the wealth-to-income axis, there is also an intermediate region where investors hold zero bonds.
This region is due to the credit spread: there exist ratios where it is too costly to leverage at the
30high borrowing rate, while it is not pro table to invest at the lower lending rate.
The reason why “gambling” with leverage decreases with age and the wealth-to-income ratio is
the presence of labor income. E ectively, an investor’s portfolio consists of both asset wealth and
human wealth. Younger and lower wealth-to-income households have relatively more human wealth.
Moreover, the correlation of human wealth and asset wealth is small. As a result, households with a
lot of labor income hold riskier strategies in the asset part of their portfolios. This e ect has also been
observed by Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996), Heaton and Lucas (2000), and Cocco (2005).
Stock v. House Ownership
For most age groups and wealth-to-income ratios, investment in houses is larger than investment
in stocks. This re ects the higher Sharpe ratio of houses as well as the fact that houses serve as
collateral while stocks do not. The latter feature also explains why the ratio of house to stock
ownership is decreasing with both age and wealth-to-income ratio: for richer and older households,
leverage is less important, and so the collateral value of a house is smaller.
The model can currently not capture the fact that the portfolio weight on stocks tends to increase
with the wealth-to-income ratio. While it is true in the model that people with higher wealth-to-
income own more stocks relative to housing, they also hold much more bonds relative to both of
the other assets. As a result, their overall portfolio weight on stocks actually falls with the wealth-
to-income ratio. The behavior of the portfolio weight on stocks implies that the model produces
typically too little concentration of stock ownership.
B. The Cross Section of Asset Holdings
Figure 7 plots predicted portfolio weights and market shares for various groups of households for 1995,
given baseline beliefs. The panels also contain actual weights and market shares for the respective
groups from the 1995 SCF. It is useful to compare both portfolio weights and market shares, since
the latter also require the model to do a good job on savings behavior. Indeed, de ning aggregate

















31where ( () is household ’s portfolio weight and ¯ ( is the aggregate portfolio weight on asset .A
model that correctly predicts the cross section of portfolio shares will therefore only correctly predict
the cross section of market shares if it also captures the cross section of terminal wealth. The latter
in turn depends on the savings rate of di erent groups of agents.
The  rst row of Figure 7 documents savings behavior by cohort and wealth level. The top left
panel plots terminal wealth as a fraction of GDP at the cohort level (blue/black lines) for the model
(dotted line) and the data (solid line). It also shows separately terminal wealth of the top decile by
net worth (green/light gray lines), again for the model and the data. This color coding of plots is
maintained throughout the  gure, so that a “good  t” means that the lines of the same color are
close to each other.
The top left panel shows that model does a fairly good job at matching terminal wealth. The
model also captures skewness of the distribution of terminal wealth and how this skewness changes
with age. The top 10% by net worth own more than half of total terminal wealth, their share
increasing with age. In the model, these properties are inherited in part from the distributions of
endowment and labor income. However, it is also the case that richer agents save more out of initial
wealth. This feature is apparent from the top right panel of Figure 7 which reports savings rates
by cohort and net worth. It obtains because () t h er i c hh a v eh i g h e rr a t i o so fi n i t i a lw e a l t hr e l a t i v e
to current labor income, and () the savings rate is increase with the wealth-to-income ratio, as
explained in the previous subsection.
In the data, the main di erence in portfolio weights by age is the shift from houses into bonds
over the course of the life cycle. This is documented in the right column of Figure 7. Young agents
borrow in order to build leveraged positions in houses. In the second panel, their portfolio weights
become positive with age as they switch to being net lenders. The accumulation of bond portfolios
makes houses — shown in the third panel on the right — relatively less important for older households.
The model captures this portfolio shift fairly well. Intuitively, younger households “gamble” more,
because the presence of future labor income makes them act in a more risk tolerant fashion in asset
markets.
The left column shows the corresponding cohort aggregates. Nominal positions relative to GDP
(second panel on the left) are  rst negative and decreasing with age, but subsequently turn around
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Figure 7: Market shares and portfolio weights for 1995
and increase with age so that they eventually become positive. These properties are present both
in the model and the data. On the negative side, the model somewhat overstates heterogeneity in
p o s i t i o n sb ya g e :t h e r ei st o om u c hb o r r o w i n g—a n dt o om u c hi n v e s t m e n ti nh o u s i n g—b yy o u n g
agents. In particular, the portfolio weights for the very youngest cohort are too extreme. However,
since the wealth of this cohort is not very large, its impact on aggregates and market shares is small.
For houses (third panel on the left), the combination of portfolio and savings choices generate a
hump shape in market share. While younger agents have much higher portfolio weights on real estate
than the middle-aged, their overall initial wealth is su ciently low, so that their market share is lower
than that of the middle-aged. Another feature of the data is that the portfolio shift from housing
33to bonds with age is much less pronounced for the rich. The model also captures this feature, as
shown by the green/gray lines in the second and third rows of the  gure. The intuition again comes
from the link between leverage and the wealth-to-income ratio: the rich are relatively asset-rich (high
wealth-to-income) and thus put together less risky asset portfolios, which implies less leverage and
lower weights on housing.
The panels in the last row of Figure 7 plot market shares and portfolio weights for equity. This
is where the model has the most problems replicating the SCF observations. Roughly, investment
in stocks in the model behaves “too much” like investment in housing. Indeed, the portfolio weight
is not only decreasing with age after age 53, as in the data, but it is also decreasing with age for
younger households. As a result, while the model does produce a hump-shaped market share, the
hump is too pronounced and occurs at too young an age. In addition, the model cannot capture the
concentration of equity ownership in the data: the rich hold relatively too few stocks.
VI Asset Prices in Temporary Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the temporary equilibrium map from model inputs — the distribution
of endowments and income, asset supply, and expectations — into equilibrium prices. We report
counterfactual experiments, based on the 1995 distribution, to illustrate the mechanics of the model
and the relative magnitude of key e ects.
Price Determination
To organize the discussion, we use the following equations, derived from the market clearing
conditions and the household budget constraints. Dropping time subscripts to simplify notation, we
have
 (1 + )=( (¯ ()ˆ ();)¯ ();  = $%	

(1 + 
)+ (1 + )+! = ) (¯ ()ˆ ();)¯ ()	 (7)
The aggregate value of long-lived asset  (where  = $ or %) must equal, in equilibrium, the value
of household demand for the asset. At the level of the individual household, asset demand can be
34written as the product of initial wealth ¯ () and the asset weight (.T h e l a t t e r w a s s h o w n i n
Figure 6 as a function of the wealth-to-income ratio ¯ ()ˆ (). It also depends on other household
characteristics such as age and expectations, as well as on the market interest rate, or equivalently
the bond price .7 The second equation says that the value of all assets held by households — in our
empirical framework, the numerator of the wealth-GDP ratio — must equal total household savings,
where the savings rate, shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 6, is denoted ).
Equations (7) implicitly determine the three asset prices ,  and 
 a saf u n c t i o no fs u p p l y ,
endowments and expectations, where the latter enter through the portfolio weight functions ( and
the savings rate function ). The second equation can be written as
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where ¯ ) is the initial-wealth-weighted average savings rate and  is aggregate initial wealth not
invested in long-lived assets, as de ned in (6).
Suppose for the moment that new asset supply is the same for equity and houses, that is,  =

 = . The intuition generated by this case is helpful for interpreting our results more generally.
The aggregate value of these assets now becomes
(8) 
 +  =
¯ )   !
1+   ¯ )
	
Other things — including expectations — equal, the value of long-lived assets decreases when the ROE
supplies more of these assets. It also decreases when the ROE raises more funds in the bond market.
Here it matters that our calibration strategy takes the market value of bond supply as given (rather
than, say, the face value). Higher bond supply in our exercises always subtracts a  xed amount
from the demand for other savings vehicles, such as houses and equity and thus lowers the value
of those vehicles. Finally, the value of long-lived assets increases with any event that increased the
average savings rate in the household sector. In particular, it depends on household expectations
7Asset demand depends on the prices of long-lived assets only through the e ects of those prices on initial wealth.
The reason is that return expectations are exogenous, execpt for bonds where they depend on the market interest rate
and expected in ation.
35only through their e ect on the average savings rate.
An important implication of equation (8) is that the total value of long-lived assets is deter-
mined by consumption-savings considerations, not by portfolio choice considerations. Indeed, at the
household level, the optimal savings rate is chosen to smooth consumption over time, given the total
return on wealth. In contrast, the weights ( on the individual assets are chosen to generate the
highest possible total return on wealth, trading o  risk and return. The total value of long-lived
assets depends strongly on aspects of the household problem that a ect the savings decision, such as
the discount factor, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the age distribution and expectations
of labor income growth. It is less sensitive to factors that matter for portfolio choice, such as the
relative returns on di erent assets. The latter factors are instead important for the individual asset
prices, as well as the bond price, which must adjust to ensure that all three equations in (7) hold.
Counterfactuals from the 1995 baseline
Table 3A illustrates the sensitivity of asset prices to changes in expectations and asset supply. The
main result is that events relevant to the stock market spill over much less into other asset markets
than events relevant to the housing market, although stock prices are themselves more responsive
to changes in expectations. Rows 2 and 3 compare one percent increases in the expected return on
stocks and houses, respectively. Since these changes a ect the relative attractiveness of assets, they
have only a small (positive) e ect on savings and hence the wealth-GDP ratio. However, they do
give rise to signi cant portfolio shifts and price changes.
Row 2 shows that a one percent increase in real stock return expectations over the next six years
raises the price dividend ratio of stocks by 15%, but raises the nominal interest rate by only 10 basis
points; it lowers the price-dividend ratio on housing by 3.5%. In contrast, row 3 shows that a one
percent increase in the expected return on real estate raises the house price by 7%, increases the
nominal interest rate by 80 basis points, and lowers stock prices by 13%. The response of stock prices
is therefore larger in both experiments. At the same time, the spillover e ect to interest rates and
to the other long-lived asset price is larger in response to a change in the expected housing return.
Table 3A also shows what happens when the supply of long-lived assets drops by 5%. For stocks,
the experiment in row 4 reduces the  ow of new equity from zero, the 1995 value, to -5%. This
36corresponds to a phase of substantial repurchases of stocks by corporations, such as that observed
in the 1980s, or alternatively to a period where foreigners buy equity from domestic households.
For houses, the experiment in row 5 reduces housing investment from its 1995 value of 4% to -1%.
In both cases, stock and house prices both rise, while the nominal interest rate falls. The housing
experiment leads to larger changes in the wealth-GDP ratio as well as larger spillover e ects to the
credit market and the respective other long-lived asset market. However, the relative change in the
house price is now larger in both experiments.
Table 3A: Counterfactuals, 1995 distribution
experiment wealth/ portfolio weights lend./ borr/ PD ratios interest rate
GDP bonds housing stocks GDP GDP housing stocks nominal
(1) baseline 2.51 .15 .60 .25 .70 .31 20.8 22.7 .061
(2) stock exp. +1% 2.54 .15 .57 .28 .70 .31 20.1 26.2 .062
(3) house exp. +1% 2.50 .15 .64 .21 .71 .32 22.1 19.2 .069
(4) stock supply  5% 2.93 .13 .62 .25 .78 .41 25.3 27.1 .055
(5) house supply  5% 3.39 .11 .64 .25 .85 .47 29.8 31.8 .051
Note: The  rst row reports 1995 baseline results for aggregate portfolio weights on bonds, housing
and stocks, gross borrowing and lending as de ned in Section A., the wealth-to-GDP ratio, the
price-dividend ratios for housing and stocks together with the nominal 6-year interest rate. The
remaining rows report counterfactuals described in the text.
The key e ect of a reduction in asset supply is that “savings vehicles” that allow the household
sector to transfer resources to the future become more scarce. As a result, all savings vehicles become
m o r ev a l u a b l e—a s s e tp r i c e sr i s e( a se x p e c t e df r o m( 8 ) )w h i l et h ei n t e r e s tr a t ef a l l s .T h ed r o pi nt h e
interest rate goes along with an increase in gross borrowing by households: households themselves
thus replace some of the supply of savings vehicles withdrawn by the rest of the economy. Compared
to the common increase in prices, the relative change in prices and the associated portfolio shift —
both favoring the asset that has become more scarce — are somewhat smaller. The e ects of a change
in supply thus work through the consumption-savings margin more than through the portfolio choice
margin.
37Comparing equity and real estate
We now consider the di erent responses of housing and equity markets to the above experiments.
In our model, housing di ers from equity because the overall scale of the housing market is bigger, its
endowment distribution is less concentrated, the mean and volatility of its return are lower and it can
be used as collateral. To isolate the role of housing as collateral, Table 3B repeats the counterfactuals
of Table 3A with arti cial data. In particular, the asset “equity” is now an arti cial asset that has
all the properties of housing in the data (that is, the same dividend, endowment distribution and
return moments), but that cannot be used as collateral.
The baseline results in row 1 isolate the value of the collateral property: the true housing asset
is about 10% more valuable than the arti cial non-collateralizable housing asset. While this number
comes from a di erent economy than the results in Table 3A and hence does not capture the actual
value of the collateral property of the US housing stock, we can conclude from this exercise that
the collateral property is not a negligible component of the value of housing. The expected return
experiments in rows 2 and 3 now give rise to essentially symmetric portfolio shifts and percentage price
changes. Collateral is therefore not responsible for the stronger price response of equity discussed
above. However, the interest rate e ects are of a similar magnitude as in Table 3A.
The role of housing as collateral is thus at least in part responsible for the stronger spillover
e ects from housing to the credit market. Intuitively, if the expected return on either long-lived
asset increases, the interest rate must also increase, so that the aggregate household sector — which
is a net lender — continues to hold the outstanding bond supply. An increase in the expected housing
return is special because it not only lowers the demand for bonds by net lenders, but also increases
the supply of bonds (that is, mortgages) by net borrowers, as the collateral constraint permits more
borrowing. Since the interest rate must rise not only to stimulate bond demand, but also to curb
supply, it rises by more than when the expected stock return rises.
The stronger response of stock prices to expected return changes in Table 3A is due to two
properties of the model. The  rst, discussed above, is that a change in the return on one of the
assets works mostly through the portfolio choice margin, and leaves total savings almost unchanged.
Since the resources raised by the ROE in the credit market are given, this means that the equilibrium
portfolio weight on bonds must also remain almost unchanged, and any increase in the weight on
38stocks, say, must be almost exactly o set by a decrease in the weight on houses. The second property
is that the stock market is smaller than the housing market. It follows that an equal shift in weights
must entail a proportionately larger change than in the value of stocks, and hence in the price-
dividend ratio on stocks. In the arti cial economy, where the scale of the two markets is the same,
this e ect vanishes.
Table 3B: Counterfactuals, Artificial Data
experiment wealth/ portfolio weights lend./ borr/ PD ratios interest rate
GDP bonds housing stocks GDP GDP housing stocks nominal
(1) baseline 2.54 .15 .45 .40 .63 .24 21.6 20.2 .054
(2) stock exp. +1% 2.55 .15 .38 .47 .60 .21 19.4 22.6 .057
(3) house exp. +1% 2.55 .15 .52 .33 .65 .26 24.1 17.8 .060
(4) stock supply  5% 2.99 .13 .45 .42 .64 .25 24.7 29.1 .052
(5) house supply  5% 3.39 .11 .46 .43 .68 .29 27.5 21.0 .049
(5) hetero in  exp 3.39 .15 .47 .38 .79 .40 22.4 19.2 .049
Aggregation
The distribution of household characteristics — in particular age and endowments — a ects asset
prices via the average savings rate (cf. (8), for example) as well as via average portfolio weights.
Since households have homothetic preferences, it is not obvious that features of the distribution other
than the means matter for prices.8 Recent work on calibrated incomplete markets models has derived
“approximate aggregation” results: moments of the wealth distribution beyond the mean often have
little e ect on equilibrium asset prices (see Krusell and Smith 2006 for a survey).
Approximate aggregation obtains if individual savings ) (¯ ()ˆ ();)¯  viewed as a function
of initial wealth ¯  are well approximated by a ne functions with a common slope:
(9) ) (¯ ()ˆ ();)¯   ( ˆ ()) + ()¯ 
8In a standard general equilibrium model with identical homothetic preferences, the wealth distribution is irrelevant
for prices: homotheticity leads to demand functions that are linear in wealth; if preferences are also identical, the slopes
are all the same and aggregate demand is linear in aggregate wealth.
39at least on the support of the wealth distribution. Here the key property is that  does not depend
on any individual characteristics 	 Assuming equal supply of equity and houses as in (8): the total
value of long lived assets is then
(10) 
 +  =
¯  +    !
1+   

where ¯  is the population-weighted average of the intercepts .T h ew e a l t h - G D Pr a t i ot h u sd e p e n d s
on the distribution of income only through the aggregate .
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Figure 8: Aggregation Results
The top panel of Figure 8 plots the ratio of savings — or terminal wealth — to the permanent
component of income ˆ  as a function of the wealth-to-income ratio ¯ ˆ , for the same age groups
as in Figure 6. Holding age  xed, savings are well approximated by an a ne function in ¯  if ¯  is
40high relative to ˆ 	9 Moreover, the intercept is negative and proportional to ˆ : rich households with
a higher permanent component of income save less overall, but they save the same fraction of every
additional unit of wealth. While approximate aggregation obtains for rich households within an age
group, the savings function is not a ne when ¯  is low relative to ˆ . This is true especially for the
youngest agents, for whom the nonnegativity constraint on savings is most relevant. In addition, the
slopes di er by age, which suggests that the wealth distribution between cohorts matters for prices.
Our framework allows to assess how much heterogeneity in wealth matters for prices by comparing
the measured wealth distribution to the model implied savings function. The bottom panel of Figure
8 plots a cumulative distribution functions for the wealth-to-income ratio ¯ ˆ  by age. For easier
interpretation, the cdf was adjusted so that integrating the savings functions for some age group
in the top panel against the density derived from the corresponding cdf in the bottom panel yields
aggregate savings (up to a scaling factor).10 Approximate aggregation within an age group thus
obtains if most of the mass is in a region where the savings function is linear. While this is true for
old and middle aged households who tend to have a lot of wealth relative to income, the majority of
young agents (29-35) is in a region where the savings function is still convex.
VII Supply, Demographics and Asset Prices 1968-95
Panels A and B of Table 4 compare the baseline model to the data not only for 1995, but also for
1968 and 1978. For 1968, the baseline model captures the fact that the wealth-GDP ratio as well as
the nominal interest rate were both slightly lower than their counterparts in 1995. It accounts for
most of the di erence because the variance of income shocks was lower in 1968, which implies that
less precautionary savings lowers wealth and interest rates. The model captures only a small fraction
of the portfolio shift towards housing that took place between 1968 and 1995. As a result, it cannot
explain the observed increase in house prices, although it does produce a drop in the price dividend
ratio on stocks.
With a spread of 2.75% between borrowing and lending rates, the model matches gross borrowing
9Comparison of Figures 6 and 8 shows that equal savings rates across individuals are su cient, but not necessary
to obtain common slopes 	 of the savings functions (9).
10More speci cally, each households’ weight was multiplied by the ratio of its individual ˆ 
 () to the aggregate ˆ 
 ()
41and lending in 1968. A fairly small drop in the spread — 75 basis points — is thus su cient to account
for the increase in the volume of credit. Changing the spread has otherwise little e ect on the
equilibrium. This is illustrated in Table 5, where we collect a set of counterfactuals designed to
provide intuition for the baseline results in Table 4. The second row of Table 5 recomputes the
equilibrium for 1968 with a spread of 2%.
Household portfolios in 1978 were very di erent from those in 1968 or 1978: wealth as a percent
of GDP was much smaller, and there was a strong portfolio shift from stocks into houses. The model
with baseline expectations held  xed delivers the  rst fact, but not the second. The wealth to GDP
ratio drops to about twice GDP in both the model and the data. However, the portfolio allocation
in the model remains essentially the same as in 1995. As a result, the price dividend ratios of houses
falls and that of houses rises, in contrast to what happened in the data.
T a b l e4 :B a s e l i n eR e s u l t s
year beliefs wealth/ portfolio weights lend./ borr/ PD ratios interest rate
GDP bonds housing stocks GDP GDP housing stocks nominal
Panel A: Data
1968 2.41 .17 .51 .32 .61 .20 20.1 32.3 .057
1978 2.08 .16 .68 .17 .56 .23 24.4 18.6 .084
1995 2.51 .15 .59 .26 .70 .31 20.4 23.9 .061
Panel B: Model
1968 baseline 2.44 .16 .59 .25 .60 .19 23.6 24.8 .059
1978 baseline 2.11 .16 .59 .25 .53 .20 21.9 28.5 .062
1995 baseline 2.51 .15 .60 .25 .70 .31 20.8 22.7 .061
Note: Panel A reports the aggregate portfolio weights on bonds, housing and stocks
from Figure 2; the gross borrowing and lending numbers from Section the SCF of 1962,
the constructed numbers for 1978 and the SCF of 1995; the wealth-to-GDP ratio from
Figure 1; the price-dividend ratios for housing and stocks together with the nominal 6-
year interest rate. Panel B reports the results computed from the model with baseline
beliefs.
Three changes in fundamentals are important for the drop in the wealth-to-GDP ratio in 1978.
The  rst is the change in the distribution of endowments illustrated in Figure 5. The special feature
42of the 1978 endowment distribution is that a larger fraction of the funds available for investment
resides with the very youngest and oldest cohorts. As shown in the last section, the model predicts
that these cohorts have small savings rates, which leads to lower wealth-to-income ratios and pushes
interest rates up. This e ect is reinforced by the e ects of low ex post real interest rates, which also
reduce the ratio of initial wealth to income and hence savings. A counteracting force is the reduction
in bond supply documented in Figure 4 which tends to lower interest rates and slightly raises the
wealth-GDP ratio. Taken together, these e ects produce relatively stable interest rates and a low
wealth-GDP ratio.
Table 5 reports experiments that consider the role of each of these three factors in isolation,
leaving the others  xed at their 1968 values. The experiment in row 3 (1978 bond supply) retains the
whole 1968 distribution of households, and changes only the supply of new bonds to the 1978 value,
a reduction of 25%. Since the supply of bonds drops, this experiment is similar to the counterfactual
experiments that reduce the house and stock supplies in Table 3A above.
Table 5: Additional Experiments for 1968 and 1978
year experiment wealth/ portfolio weights lend./ borr/ PD ratios int. rate
GDP bonds housing stocks GDP GDP housing stocks nom.
1968 (1) baseline 2.44 .16 .59 .25 .60 .19 23.6 24.8 .059
1968 (2) spread = 2% 2.44 .16 .60 .24 .66 .25 23.8 24.4 .063
1968 (3) 1978 bond supply 2.52 .13 .62 .25 .57 .24 25.5 26.4 .056
1968 (4) 1978 bond endowm. 2.32 .18 .58 .24 .58 .17 22.0 23.4 .061
1978 (5) baseline 2.11 .16 .59 .25 .53 .20 21.9 28.5 .062
1978 (6) 1968 bond market 2.18 .15 .60 .25 .55 .22 22.9 29.3 .060
Note: The table reports model results for various years and counterfactuals.
The results are also similar: a reduction in the supply of any savings vehicle — here bonds —
raises the prices of all savings vehicles; it thus raises the wealth to GDP ratio and lowers the nominal
interest rate. Lower nominal interest rates in turn lead to more borrowing within the household
sector — borrowing households supply more bonds now, mitigating some of the shortfall of bond
43supply from the rest of the rest of the economy. Because of the collateral constraint, borrowing goes
along with more investment in housing relative to stocks — house prices increase proportionately more
than stock prices and there is a portfolio shift from bonds into housing.
The experiment in row 4 (1968 bond endowments) retains the 1968 bond supply as well as the
1968 distribution of income, house and stock endowments. However, it constructs bond endowments
by updating bond holdings with an interest rate factor that is about 3% lower than the factor used
in the 1968 baseline case. The new factor thus lowers the initial wealth of lenders and increases the
initial wealth of borrowers; its value is selected to make aggregate payo s on bonds as a percent of
GDP as low as in 1978, where in ation signi cantly reduced the ex post real interest rate.
The e ect of this experiment is the opposite of a reduction in asset supply: a reduction in bond
payo s lowers initial wealth and thus reduces the demand for all savings vehicles and lowers all prices
as well as the wealth-GDP ratio. The reason is that the household sector on aggregate is a net lender
so that for the majority of households (in wealth-weighted terms) the wealth-income ratio and the
savings rate go down. Of course, at the same time, borrower households experience an increase in
their wealth-income ratio, so that the distribution of wealth-income ratios becomes less dispersed.
This explains the drop in gross credit volume from the experiment.
Line 6 (1968 bond market) uses the 1978 distribution, but  xes the bond supply at its 1968 value.
In addition, it increases the bond endowments by raising the interest rate factor by about 3%, so
that the aggregate bond endowments is also at the higher 1968 value. This is a way to isolate the
e ect of the income and endowment distribution from the other two factors. The result is a drop in
the wealth-GDP ratio that is twice as large as the drop caused by lower bond endowments alone. It
is driven by the lower savings rates of the 1978 population.
VIII The E ects of In ation
In this section, we consider the e ects of in ation on the price-dividend ratios of real assets in the
1970s. We use our model to quantify the extent to which changes in () expected in ation, ()
in ation uncertainty and () lower stock returns predicted by high expected in ation contribute to
higher house prices and lower stock prices. We also consider the implications of lower expectations
44about real growth. To compare di erent expectation scenarios, we not only look at stock and house
prices, but also at the nominal interest rate, the volume of credit, the overall ratio of wealth to GDP
and household portfolio weights. The relevant statistics are reported in Table 6. Rows 1 and 2 simply
repeat the Table 4 statistics from the data and the results based on baseline beliefs, respectively.
Expected In ation and Taxes
Row 3 of Table 6 focus on the e ects of higher expected in ation. Row 3, labelled “hi in ation
expectations” increases expected in ation for all households from the baseline number of 4% to the
median 5-year in ation forecast from the Michigan survey, averaged over the trading period, which
is 6.3%. In this experiment, all e ects of expected in ation are due to nominal rigidities in the tax
system. In particular, taxation of nominal returns makes housing more attractive as an investment
relative to stocks and bonds, and it encourages mortgage borrowing.
To see the e ect of expected in ation on real after tax returns, let +
 denote the pretax real
return on equity and let  denote the in ation rate. Under our assumption of a single e ective tax
rate on nominal equity returns, the after-tax real return on equity is (1   )+
   	 The expected
after-tax real return on equity is thus decreasing in expected in ation. In contrast, we have assumed
that housing returns are not taxed, so that the expected real return on housing does not depend on
expected in ation. As expected in ation increases, real estate thus become more attractive relative
to equity. The return on nominal bonds is (1   )    =( 1  )+
    where  is the nominal
interest rate and +
 =   is the pretax real return. Given a nominal rate, holding bonds thus also
becomes less attractive as expected in ation increases, whereas mortgage borrowing becomes more
attractive because interest is tax deductible.
Compared to the baseline, higher expected in ation leads to a drop in the price-dividend ratio on
stocks and an increase in the price-dividend ratio on houses. At the same time, the nominal interest
rate increases by more than the increase in expected in ation. Both results follow directly from the
increased tax burdens on stocks and bonds. On the one hand, the taxation of nominal equity returns
works like a change in expected stock returns, already discussed in Section VI: a drop in the expected
return on stocks does not change the wealth-GDP ratio or interest rate much, but lowers the price
of stocks. On the other hand, the taxation of nominal interest induces an in ation premium on top
o ft h ei n c r e a s ei nt h en o m i n a lr a t ew a r r a n t e db yt h eF i s h e re q u a t i o n .
45Quantitatively, the changes in household portfolios shown in row 3 do not come close to matching
the portfolio shift of the 1970s shown in row 1. At the same time, the resulting nominal interest rate
of 9% is more than half a percentage point higher than the observed rate of 8.4%. Our calculations
are based on a tax rate of 20%, which is consistent with the numbers reported by Sialm (2006) for
average e ective tax rates on equity returns as well as capital gains tax rates in the 1970s. It is still
interesting to ask what happens for higher tax rates. To match the portfolio weights exactly requires
a tax rate of 45%. However, the resulting increase in the in ation premium pushes the nominal
interest rate up to 10.7%, and the overall lower after tax return on wealth lowers the wealth-GDP
ratio to 2.02. This reveals a basic tension between tax e ects on long-lived assets and the credit
market. We conclude that the e ects of expected in ation through taxes cannot be the only factor
behind the 1970s portfolio shift.
Expected In ation and Disagreement
According to the Michigan Survey, households disagreed about expected in ation in the 1970s.
Interestingly, disagreement is related to age in a systematic way. Figure 9 plots population me-
dian forecasts since 1979 together with median forecasts for the youngest and oldest cohorts in the
Michigan survey. During the high in ation years in the late 1970s and early 1980s, older households
expected much lower in ation than younger households; the discrepancy vanished as in ation sub-
sided in the 1990s. Our model o ers a natural laboratory for studying the impact of heterogeneity
in expectations by age. The exercise in row 4 of Table 6, labelled “heterogeneous in ation expec-
tations”, assumes that the in ation rate expected by an age cohort in the model is equal to the
corresponding cohort median in the Michigan Survey.
Heterogeneity in in ation expectations introduces disagreement about real rates – a second
mechanism that pushes house prices up and stock prices down. This disagreement stimulates bor-
rowing and lending among households and drives up the (relative) price of collateral, that is, houses.
Indeed, given a nominal interest rate quoted in the credit market, young households (who expect
high in ation) perceive a lower real interest rate than old households (who expect low in ation).
This generates gains from trade: young households believe that borrowing is a bargain and borrow
from old households, who are happy to lend. Since any borrowing requires collateral, more credit
created within the household sector leads to a stronger demand for housing, which drives up house













Figure 9: Median in ation expectations over the next 5 years, Michigan Survey of Consumers. The
lines with “young households” and “old households” represent expecations by the youngest (18-34
years) and oldest (above 65 years) cohorts in the Michigan survey. These lines provide bounds for
the expectations by other cohorts (not shown in the picture), which are monotonic in age.
prices. At the same time, both borrowers and lenders lower their demand for stocks: the former
prefer houses, while the latter prefer bonds. As a result, the stock price falls.
Quantitatively, a switch from the baseline to survey expectations explains half the observed
portfolio shift from the baseline 59% portfolio weight on housing to the observed 68%. Compared
with (homogeneous) “hi in ation expectations,” the (heterogeneous) survey expectations generate
double the portfolio shift, without changing our previous conclusions about the nominal interest rate
and wealth-GDP ratio. The survey expectations also lead to an increase in borrowing and lending.
While any disagreement about real rates leads to gains from trade, the basic e ect is reinforced in
our context because in ation expectations are correlated with households’ propensity to borrow: as
discussed in Section 7, younger households tend to have lower wealth relative to permanent income
and leverage up more.
47In ation Uncertainty
The “hi in ation volatility” experiment reported in row 5 of Table 6 doubles the conditional
volatility of in ation, from 3% to 6% p.a. It is motivated by the increase in uncertainty about
in ation. In our model, higher conditional volatility of in ation increases the conditional volatility of
real bond returns and the ex post real cost of mortgage  nancing. The main di erence to the baseline
results is that there is now less nominal borrowing and lending within the household sector and a
higher nominal interest rate. The lower volume of credit is natural as nominal instruments have
become less attractive to both borrowers and lenders. The nominal interest rate increases because
the household sector as a whole is a net lender and must be compensated if it is to hold the nominal
debt of the rest of the economy.
Increasing in ation volatility has little e ect on the overall wealth-GDP ratio. Indeed, it is a
comparative static that a ects the returns on one asset, leaving those on other assets unchanged. As
is the case for other experiments of this type, the overall return on wealth and the savings decision
are not a ected much and the equilibrium wealth-GDP ratio stays essentially the same. Aggregate
portfolio weights also remain unchanged. On the one hand, households are required to hold the same
value of bonds issued by the rest of the economy in equilibrium, so that the portfolio weight on bonds
remains unchanged if the wealth-GDP does not change. On the other hand, the e ect of a change
in the relative volatility of after tax returns on stocks and houses is quantitatively small so that the
weights on stocks and houses also move little.
Lower Stock Return and Growth Expectations
In rows 6-8 of Table 6, we consider experiments that increase pessimism about various parts of
the U.S. economy. Row 6 considers lower expected stock returns, row 7 assumes lower growth in the
aggregate component of non-asset income, and row 8 assumes lower returns on both long-lived assets
together with low non-asset income growth. The latter case can be viewed as capturing pessimism
about the economy as a whole, which shows up in lower expectations of both dividends and non-
asset income. Within our framework, it does not matter where lower return expectations come from.
O n es o u r c eo fp e s s i m i s mi nt h e1 9 7 0 sw a sa ne x p e c t e ds l o w d o w ni np r o d u c t i v i t y .A n o t h e rw a sl o w
projections of corporate pro ts due to higher in ation. In ation thus motivates an experiment in
which stock return expectations are lower, while expected payo s on human capital and housing
48remain unchanged.
To get an idea about the plausible order of magnitude for pessimism induced by in ation, we
use the study of Fama and Schwert (1977), who document that measures of expected in ation are
signi cant predictors of stock returns. The regression results in their Table 6 represent real-time
forecasts of returns on a variety of assets — stocks, housing, and bonds — based on data available at
that time. Their results indicate that a one percentage-point increase in expected in ation lowers
the forecast of real stock returns by roughly 6 percentage points over the following year, but leaves
the forecasts of real housing returns unchanged. Assuming that today’s in ation forecasts do not
predict stock returns beyond the next year, the 1.5 percentage point increase in expected in ation
measured by the Michigan Survey would lower expected real stock returns over the next 6 years by
roughly 1.5 percentage points.
Row 6 of Table 6 reports results for stock return expectations that are 1.5 percentage points
lower than the historical mean. Since this experiment also changes the returns on only one asset,
it does not a ect strongly the savings decision and the wealth-GDP ratio moves little. However, as
households lower their return expectations for stocks, other assets become relatively more attractive
and thus valuable. As in the counterfactual experiments in Table 3A, the price-dividend ratios of
stocks and housing are highly sensitive to households’ subjective equity return; in particular, the
stock market falls by 25%. The interest rate falls, although the e ect is not large. This scenario is
able to generate large movements in the price of real assets together with a drop in the interest rate.
Row 8 of Table 6 shows that the situation is di erent if pessimism a ects not only the corporate
sector, but also labor income and the dividends on housing. Relative to the baseline, a 1% drop in
expected growth induces a signi cant increase in the wealth-GDP ratio (about 10%) together with
a large drop in the interest rate, by 1.3 percentage points. Two e ects combine to generate this
result. First, a drop in expected non-asset income lowers the permanent component of non-asset
i n c o m ew h i c hi n c r e a s e st h es a v i n g sr a t e so fa l lh o u s e h o l d sa n dd r i v e su pt h ep r i c e so ft h el o n g - l i v e d
assets. This e ect is also relevant when dividends are not a ected at all: row 7 shows an increase
in the wealth-GDP ratio when only non-asset income growth is expected to be lower. Second, the
interest rate must fall to lower the return on bonds and bring it back in line with the lower expected
return on stocks and houses. In equilibrium, the portfolio weights then remain unchanged, since the
49experiment has not changed the relative returns on stocks and houses much.
Table 6: The Effects of Inflation
wealth/ portfolio weights lend./ borr./ PD ratios nominal
beliefs GDP bonds housing stocks GDP GDP housing stocks int. rate
(1) –1978 data – 2.08 .16 .68 .16 .56 .23 24.4 18.6 .084
(2) baseline 2.11 .16 .59 .25 .53 .20 21.9 28.5 .062
(3) hi in  exp 2.09 .16 .61 .23 .53 .20 22.2 25.8 .090
(4) hetero in  exp 2.09 .16 .63 .21 .68 .35 22.8 24.3 .089
(5) hi in  volatility 2.11 .16 .59 .25 .51 .18 21.9 27.9 .066
(6) stock exp — 1.5% 2.05 .16 .64 .20 .54 .21 23.0 21.6 .060
Lower expected growth
(7) labor -1% 2.27 .15 .60 .25 .57 .24 23.9 30.8 .060
(8) ...& returns -1% 2.25 .15 .59 .26 .56 .23 23.1 31.6 .049
Combination
(9) 2.13 .16 .68 .16 .56 .23 24.9 19.0 .084
Note: Rows 1 and 2 repeat the results with baseline expectations from Table 3. The
other scenarios change expectations over the next six years away from the baseline. Row
3 (“hi in ation expectations”) increases households’ expected in ation from the baseline
4% to the median 6.3% in the Michigan Survey of Consumers, averaged over 1975-1980.
Row 4 (“heterogeneous in ation expectations”) sets every age cohort’s expected in ation
in the model equal to the cohort median in the Michigan Survey, averaged over 1975-80.
Row 5 (“high in ation volatility”) doubles the conditional volatility of in ation. Row 6
lowers expected pretax stock returns by 1.5%. Row 7 lowers the expected growth rate
of non-asset income by 1%. Row 8 lowers the expected growth rate of non-asset income
as well as expected pretax house and stock returns by 1%. Row 9 combines expected
cohort in ation rates (as in row 4), lower expected growth rates of non-asset income
and expected house returns by .88%, lower pretax expected stock returns by 2.6%, and
multiplies the conditional volatility of in ation by a factor of 4.
Combining Expectations of High In ation and Low Growth
The discussion so far suggests that neither higher and more uncertain in ation expectations nor
lower growth expectations can by themselves account for the experience of the 1970s. Under survey
in ation expectations and baseline in ation uncertainty, there is some portfolio shift towards housing,
but the volume of credit and the interest rate are higher than in the data. In ation uncertainty
50reduces the volume of credit, but pushes the interest rate even higher. Lower expected growth only
leads to a portfolio shift if pessimism is restricted to the corporate sector. Otherwise its main e ect
is to o set the wealth dip that the model generates at baseline beliefs and to lower the interest rate.
It is natural to ask whether a combination of the above e ects can provide a plausible account
of the 1970s. This question is addressed by the experiment in row 9 of Table 6. It assumes that
expected in ation comes from the Michigan survey cohort medians, but also that the conditional
volatility of in ation is multiplied by 4, that expected income growth and house returns drop by 	9%
(relative to the baseline) and stock returns drop by 2.6%. In other words, overall growth is expected
to drop by close to 1%, while stock returns are expected to drop by an additional 1.7%, about the
amount motivated above by the role of expected in ation as a predictor of returns. The results show
that all portfolio moments and the interest rate are matched exactly, while the wealth-GDP ratio is
still very close to the benchmark and hence also to its value in the data.
Our combination experiment suggests a story according to which asset prices and household
positions in the 1970s were driven by two forces. First, there were three channels through which
changes in in ation expectations drove the portfolio shift: a little more than half of the shift was due
to the fact that higher expected in ation predicts lower stock returns, while about one quarter each
was due to disagreement about real interest rates and nominal rigidities in the tax code. Disagreement
also accounted for the increase in credit volume, which would have been even stronger without the
increase in in ation uncertainty. The second important force was lower expected growth. Here
pessimism about labor income and pessimism about asset returns had o setting e ects on the wealth-
GDP ratio, which was mostly driven by demographics and the e ects of surprise in ation (cf Section
VII). At the same time, pessimism about asset returns put downward pressure on interest rates that
partly o set the e ects of expected in ation.
IX Conclusion
In this paper, we have combined aggregate data from the Flow of Funds with household-level data
from successive SCF cross sections. This approach allows us to measure the income and asset endow-
ment distribution across households at the beginning of each trading period. To capture structural
51change, we consider a sequence of temporary equilibria of this heterogeneous agent economy. There
are three assets — housing, stocks and nominal bonds. There is no riskless asset, so that market
are incomplete. During the 1970s, households anticipate higher in ation and view in ation as more
uncertain. In particular, we document that young households adjusted their in ation forecasts more
than old agents. These changes in in ation expectations make housing more attractive, because of
capital gains taxes on stocks and mortgage deductibility. Moreover, agents interpret higher in ation
expectations as bad news for future stock returns. Taken together, these e ects can then explain the
opposite movements of house and stock prices in the 1970s.
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A Assets and Income
This appendix describes how we map observed asset classes into the three assets present in the model,
and how we measure aggregate and household level asset holdings, as well as non-asset income.
A. Data and De nitions
We map the three assets in the model to three broad asset classes in US aggregate and household
statistics. Our main data sources are the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) for aggregates and the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for individual positions. To make these data sets comparable,
we must ensure that aggregates match. As shown by Antoniewicz (2004), the match is good for most
asset classes in both 1989 and 1995, after a few adjustments. However, our own computations show
that the match for nominal assets is bad for the 1962 SCF. For some classes of assets, especially
short-term deposits, the SCF aggregates are only about 50% of the FFA aggregates. Apparent
underreporting of short-term nominal assets is also present in later SCFs, but is less severe. To
achieve a comparable time series of positions, we assume throughout that the FFA aggregates are
correct and that individual positions in the SCF su er from proportional measurement error. We
then multiply each individual position by the ratio of the FFA aggregate and the SCF aggregate for
the same asset class.
Asset classes
We identify equity with shares in corporations held and controlled by households, including both
publicly traded and closely held shares, and both foreign and domestic equity. We also include shares
held indirectly through investment intermediaries if the household can be assumed to control the
asset allocation (into our broad asset classes). We take this to be true for mutual funds and de ned
contribution (DC) pensions plans. For these intermediaries, while the fund manager determines the
precise composition of the portfolio, the household typically makes the decision about equity versus
bonds by selecting the type of fund.
We thus consolidate mutual funds and DC pension funds. For example, when households own a
56mutual fund, an estimate of the part of the fund invested in stocks is added to stock holdings. In
contrast, we do not include equity held in de ned bene t (DB) pension plans, since the portfolios
of these plans are not controlled by households themselves. Instead, DB plans are treated as a
tax-transfer system sponsored by the rest of the economy (in practice, the corporate sector or the
government). We also do not include noncorporate business, which is treated partly as real estate
and partly as labor income, as described below.
We construct an annual series for the aggregate value of household sector equity holdings. Our
starting point is the published series in the FFA. We cannot use that series directly, since it contains
() the market value of the equity component of foreign direct investment (that is, equity positions
by foreigners in excess of 10% of shares in a US corporation) and () the market value of equity held
by DB pension funds. We estimate the equity component of FDI using data on the International
Investment Position from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Shares held by de ned bene t pension
funds are available from the FFA. Our series is obtained by subtracting () and () from the FFA
series on household equity holdings.
We derive estimates of net new equity purchased by households using a similar correction of FFA
numbers. Finally, our concept of dividends equals dividends received by households from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) less dividends on their holdings in DB pension plans. We use
the numbers on value, dividends and new issues to calculate price dividend ratios and holding returns
on equity. The properties of the return series are discussed in Appendix B below. For household-level
positions, we use the Survey of Consumer Finances, which also contains direct holdings of publicly-
traded and closely-held shares, as well as an estimate of equity held indirectly through investment
intermediaries.
Our concept of residential real estate contains owner-occupied housing, directly held residential
investment real estate, as well as residential real estate recorded in the FFA/NIPA as held indi-
rectly by households through noncorporate businesses. This concept contains almost all residential
real estate holdings, since very few residential properties are owned by corporations. To construct
holdings of tenant-occupied residential real-estate at the individual level, we start from the SCF
numbers and then add a proportional share of the household’s noncorporate business position. This
share is selected so that our aggregate of tenant-occupied real estate over all households matches
57the corresponding value from the FFA. We take housing dividends to be housing consumption net
of maintenance and property tax from NIPA. For net purchases of new houses, we use aggregate
residential investment from NIPA. As with equity, the annual series for holdings, dividends and new
issues give rise to a return series, discussed below.
Household bond holdings are set equal to the net nominal position, that is, the market value
of all nominal assets minus the market value of nominal liabilities. Nominal assets again include
indirect holdings through investment intermediaries. To calculate market value, we use the market
value adjustment factors for nominal positions in the U.S. from Doepke and Schneider (2006). In line
with our treatment of tenant-occupied real estate, we assign residential mortgages issued by noncor-
porate businesses directly to households. At the individual level, we assign a household mortgages in
proportion to his noncorporate business position, again with a share selected to match the aggregate
value of residential mortgages from the FFA.
Non-Asset Income
Our concept of non-asset income comprises all income that is available for consumption or invest-
ment, but not received from payo s of one of our three assets. We start by constructing an aggregate
measure of such income from NIPA. Of the various components of worker compensation, we include
only wages and salaries, as well as employer contributions to DC pension plans. We do not include
employer contributions to DB pension plans or health insurance, since these funds are not available
for consumption or investment. However, we do include bene ts disbursed from DB plans and health
plans. Also included are transfers from the government. Finally, we subtract personal income tax
on non-asset income.
Non-asset income also includes dividends from noncorporate business except those attributable
to residential real estate. To construct the latter concept of noncorporate dividends, we use the
aggregate price-dividend ratio of housing to estimate the housing dividend provided by an individ-
ual’s private business. Our approach essentially splits up the noncorporate sector into a real estate
component that is very capital intensive and relies heavily on debt  nance, and a rest that is much
more labor intensive. Indeed, the capital stock of the noncorporate non nancial sector in 1995 was
$3.6trn, of which $2.4trn was residential real estate.
58Given the aggregate series of income, we apply the same conventions to individual income in the
SCF to the extent possible. A problem is that the SCF does not report employer contributions to DC
plans and only reports pretax income for all items. To address this issue, we apply a proportional tax
rate to pretax non-asset income reported in the SCF, where the tax rate is chosen such that aggregate
non-asset income is equal to its counterpart from NIPA. The outcome is an income distribution that
matches with NIPA at the aggregate level.
B. Measuring the Distribution of Endowments
Consumers in our model are endowed with both assets and non-asset income. To capture decisions
made by the cross-section of households, we thus have to initialize the model for every period  with
a joint distribution of asset endowment and income. We derive this distribution from asset holdings
a n di n c o m eo b s e r v e di nt h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d   1. Limits on data availability imply that we have
to resort to di erent approaches for the di erent years. For 1995, the data situation is best, since
we can use the SCF in the 4th year of period  together with the SCF from the 4th year of period
 1. We describe our strategy  rst for this case. We then explain how it is modi ed for earlier years
where less data are available.
Approximating the distribution of households
In principle, one could use all the households in SCF and update them individually. This would
lead to a large number of agents and consequently a large number of portfolio problems would have
to be solved. We simplify by approximating the distribution of endowments and income with a small
number of household types. First, we sort households into the same nine age groups described at the
beginning of this section. Within each age group, we then select 6 subclasses of SCF households. We
start by extracting the top 10% of households by net worth. Among the bottom 90% net worth, we
divide by homeowner and renter. We then divide homeowners further into “borrowers” and “lenders.”
Here a household is a borrower if his net nominal position — nominal asset minus nominal liabilities
— is negative. We further subdivide each homeowner category into high/low wealth-to-income ratios.
The above procedure splits up households into 9 × 6 = 54 di erent cells. We assume that all
households that fall into the same cell are identical and compute asset positions at the cell level. The
SCF survey weights determine the cell population. Naturally, the procedure loses some features of
59the true distribution due to aggregation. However, it ensures that key properties of the distribution
that we are interested in are retained. In particular, because very few among the top 10% are net
nominal borrowers, gross borrowing and lending are very close in the true and the approximating
distributions. In addition, the approximating distributions retains asset positions conditional on age
a sw e l la sc o n d i t i o n a lo nw e a l t hw h e nn e tw o r t hi ss p l i ta st o p1 0 %a n dt h er e s t ,o u rk e ym e a s u r e s
of concentration described.
Asset endowments for a transiting individual household
Consider the transition of an individual household’s asset position from period    1 into period
. We have treated both stocks and houses as long-lived trees and we normalize the number of trees
carried into the period by consumers to one. We can thus measure the household’s endowment of a
long-lived asset from its share in total market capitalization of the asset in period    1.T h eS C F
does not contain consumption data. Using the language introduced in the discussion of the budget
constraint (4), we can thus measure either initial or terminal wealth in a given period, but not both.
We assume that terminal wealth can be directly taken from the survey. The initial supply of assets
is normalized to one, so that the initial holdings of housing ¯ 


 and stocks ¯ 
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Updating Nominal Positions
For the nominal assets, the above approach does not work since these assets are short-term in our
model. Instead, we determine the market value of nominal positions in period  1 and update it to
period  by multiplying it with a nominal interest rate factor. In particular, suppose that 
 1 () is








= market share of household  in period    1	
60We de ne the initial holdings of bonds for household  as















As an interest factor for a positive (lending) position, we use an average of 6-year bond rates between
the 4th year of period  a n dt h e4 t hy e a ro fp e r i o d   1.W ea d das p r e a df o rt h eb o r r o w i n gr a t e .
The spread is 2% for 1995 and 2.75% for 1968 and 1978, for reasons described in the calibration
section V.
Forecasting Income
The  nal step in our construction of the joint income and endowment distribution is to specify
the marginal distribution of non-asset income. Here we make use of the fact that income is observed
in period    1 i nt h eS C F .W et h e na s s u m et h a tt h et r a n s i t i o nb e t w e e n   1 and  is determined
by a stochastic process for non-asset income. We employ the same process that agents in the model
use to forecast their non-asset income, described in the next subsection. If the assumption were
true, and if there were a large number of identical individuals in every cell, then our discretization
implies that households in a cell should split up into nine di erent cells in the following period, with
fractions provided by the probabilities of the income process. This is what we assume. As a result,
the distribution of agents in period  is approximated by 9 × 6 × 9 = 486 di erent cells. For each
cell, we know the endowment of assets as well as income, and we have a set of population weights
that sums to the total population.
Non-transiting households
The previous discussion has covered only households who transit from period  into period +1.
We also need to take into account the creation and destruction of households between  1 and .I n
years where successive SCFs are available, we calculate “birthrates” and “deathrates” for households
directly by comparing these surveys. We assume that exiting households receive no labor income,
but sell their assets and consume the proceeds, while entering households start with zero assets and
the average labor income of their cohort. This is a simpli ed view that does not do justice to the
many di erent reasons why households form and dissolve, and how wealth is passed along among
61households. However, we view it as a useful benchmark.
Time periods without two successive SCFs
F o rp e r i o d sb e f o r e1 9 8 0 ,t h ea b o v es t r a t e g yc a n n o tb ee x e c u t e da si s ,b e c a u s ew ed on o th a v et w o
consecutive SCFs. For the period 1965-70, the 1962 SCF is used to determine the initial endowment
and income distribution. The only di culty here is the adjustment of exiting and entering households.
We use data from the Census Bureau on the evolution of household populations to gauge the size of
exiters and entrants. The average labor income of the entering cohort is then estimated by multiplying
per capita income of the young in the 1962 SCF by the growth rate of aggregate per capita labor
income.
For the period 1975-80, we do not have SCF information for period    1. As for the 1960s,
the updating of population weights is performed using Census data. To estimate the cross sectional
distribution of endowments and income, we start from the 1962 distribution and its division of
households into cells and modify cell holdings to obtain a new distribution. In particular, we calculate
the unique distribution such that, for stocks, real estate, nominal assets, nominal debt and income,
() aggregates match the aggregates from the FFA for the period 1969-74, () the ratio of holdings
between individual members of any two cells is the same as in the 1962 SCF and () the relative
size of a cell within its age cohort is the same as in the 1962 SCF.
Condition () and () imply that per capita holdings or income within a cohort changes in order
to account for di erences in demographics while simultaneously matching aggregates. Conditions
() and () imply that the cross section conditional on age is the same in the two years. The reason
for using the 1962 distribution as the starting point rather than, say the 1989 distribution, is that
the early 1970s aggregates — especially gross nominal assets — appear more similar to 1962 than to
aggregates from the 1980s. Once we have a distribution of positions at the cell level for 1969-74, we
proceed as above to generate an updated distribution for 1975-80.
C. Asset Supply
The endowment of the ROE sector consists of new equity issued during the trading period. The
factor  states this endowment relative to total market capitalization in the model. We thus use
62net new corporate equity divided by total household holdings of corporate equity. We obtain the
corresponding measure for housing by dividing residential investment by the value of residential real
estate. The calibration of the model uses six-year aggregates. The initial nominal position of the
ROE is taken to be minus the aggregate (updated) net nominal position of the household sector.
Finally, the new net nominal position of the ROE sector in period  —i no t h e rw o r d s ,t h e“ s u p p l yo f
bonds” to the household sector — is taken to be minus the aggregate net nominal positions from the
FFA for period .
B Baseline Expectations
This appendix describes agents’ expectations about returns and income in the future under the
baseline scenario.
Non-Asset Income
We specify a stochastic process to describe consumer expectations about after-tax income. The
functional form for this process is motivated by existing speci cations for labor income that employ
a deterministic trend to capture age-speci c changes in income, as well as permanent and transitory
components. In particular, following Zeldes (1989) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), we assume






w h i c hh a sac o m m o nc o m p o n e n t- an age pro le ., a permanent idiosyncratic component /
 and
a transitory idiosyncratic component 

.
The growth rate of the common component - is equal to the growth rate of aggregates, such
as GDP and aggregate income, in the economy. It is common to specify the transitory idiosyncratic















 is i.i.d with mean one. The permanent component /
 follows a random walk with mean
one. The permanent component solves
ln/
 =l n/












	 In our numerical proce-
dures, we discretize the state process using Gauss—Hermite quadrature with three states.

















 =1 	 T a b l eB . 1r e p o r t st h ep r o   l er e l a t i v et ot h ei n c o m eo ft h ey o u n g e s tc o h o r t .
T a b l eB . 1 :I n c o m eA g ep r o f i l e
29 35 41 47 53 59 65 71 77 88+
2 . 0 42 . 5 13 . 1 73 . 8 04 . 5 63 . 8 13 . 0 01 . 9 31 . 4 21 . 1 7
Note: Income age pro les estimated from the SCF. The numbers represent the average
cohort income relative to the average income of the youngest cohort (  23 years).
We obtain an estimate of the variance of permanent shocks by computing the cross-sectional
variance of labor income for each cohort before retirement ("65 years) and then regressing it on
a constant and cohort age. The intercept of this regression line is .78, while the annualized slope
coe cient is .014.11 We thus set 2
 =1 	4% and time-aggregate this variance for our six-year periods.
This number is in line with more sophisticated estimations of labor income processes, which tend to
produce estimates between 1% and 2% per year.
Typical estimates of the variance of temporary shocks 2
 are 2-10 times larger than those of the
variance of permanent shocks. Moreover, several studies have shown that the variance of temporary
shocks to log wages has increased since the 1970s. For example, Heathcote et al. (2004) show that
the variance of log wages increased from about .05 in the 1970s to .07 in 1995. To capture this
increase in temporary income risk, we adopt their numbers, thus assuming that the variance of hours
is constant. We set 2
 = 	05 for the years 1968 and 1978 and 2
 = 	07 for 1995.12 In all years,
agents in the model assume that this variance is  xed forever. Finally, we determine the variance of
11Of course, this simple approach uses only the cross-section and thus potentially confounds age and time or cohort
e ects. However, when we rerun the regression with SCF wages, using the similar sample selection criteria as Storesletten
et al. (2004), our results are close to what these authors  nd for 1995 from an analysis with panel data on wages.
12The  xed e ects only matter for the updating of the income distribution, as explained in the previous section. The
model’s results are not sensitive to the magnitude of these e ects. For example, the results based on our model are
unchanged when we use the estimates provided by Heathcote et al. (2004).
64the  rst draw of permanent income from the intercept of our regression line. For the earlier years,
we scale down this initial variance by the relative change in the permanent component of income for
the youngest agents in Heathcote et al. (2004). This is a simple way to accommodate changes in
income due to education over time. Sensitivity checks have shown that the initial draw of permanent
income does not matter much for the results, since it does not directly a ect the portfolio problem.
Most labor income studies focus on pre-retirement income. There are major challenges to obtain-
ing variance estimates for retirement income. For example, older households tend to experience large
shocks to health expenditures, which are included as NIPA income if they are disbursed by health
plans. These shocks contain both transitory and permanent components (see the estimates reported
in Appendix A, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1994). Since these shocks are hard to measure at
the household level, we could try to ignore their variances and assume that household receive a safe
stream of income during retirement. However, this implies that precautionary savings drop dramat-
ically as soon as the household enters retirement in the absence of such shocks. This prediction is
not consistent with the household savings data from the SCF. For this reason, we apply the above
shocks to income at any age, including retirement.
Returns and aggregate growth
We assume that consumers believe real asset returns and aggregate growth to be serially indepen-
dent over successive six year periods. Moreover, when computing an equilibrium for a given period ,
we assume that returns are identically distributed for periods beyond  +1 	 We will refer to this set
of beliefs — to be described below — as baseline beliefs. However, in our exercises we will allow beliefs
for returns between  and  +1to di er. For example, we will explore what happens when expected
in ation is higher over the next six year period. We discuss the latter aspect of beliefs below when
we present our results. Here we focus on how we  x the baseline.
To pick numbers for baseline beliefs, we start from empirical moments. Table B.2 reports summary
statistics on ex-post realized pre-tax real returns on  xed income securities, residential real estate
and equity, as well as in ation and growth. These returns are measured over six year periods, but
reported at annualized rates. Since we work with aggregate portfolio data from the FFA, we construct
returns on corporate equity and residential real estate directly from FFA aggregates.







2	68 4	81 8	51 4	01 2	19
Standard Deviations/Correlations
3	24  0	02 0	56  0	04 0	33
 0	02 3	31  0	04  0	13 0	38
0	56  0	04 22	87  0	52 0	20
 0	04  0	13  0	52 5	60  0	40
0	33 0	38 0	20  0	40 1	31
Sharpe Ratios
0.45 0.27
Note: The table reports annualized summary statistics of six-year log real returns. Below
the means, the matrix has standard deviations on the diagonal and correlations on the o -
diagonal. The last row contains the Sharpe ratios. The log in ation rate  is computed
using the CPI, while & is the log growth rate of GDP multiplied by the factor 2.2/3.3 to
match the mean growth rate of consumption.
Baseline beliefs assume that the payo  on bonds 1+1 i sb a s e do na( n e t )i n   a t i o nr a t e+1 1
with a mean of 4% per year, and that the volatility of +1 is the same as the unconditional volatility
of real bond returns, about 1.3% per year. To obtain capital gains from period  to +1,w et a k et h e
value of total outstandings from the FFA in +1, and subtract the value of net new issues (or, in the
case of real estate, new construction.) To obtain dividends on equity in period , we use aggregate
net dividends. To obtain dividends on real estate, we take total residential housing sector output
from the NIPA, and subtract materials used by the housing sector. For bond returns, we use a six
year nominal interest rate derived by extrapolation from the term structure in CRSP, and subtract
realized in ation, measured by the CPI. Here growth is real GDP growth.
The properties of the equity and bond returns are relatively standard. The return on bonds has
a low mean of 2.7% and a low standard deviation of 3.2%. The return on stocks has a high mean of
8.5% and a standard deviation of 23%. What is less familiar is the aggregate return on residential
real estate: it has a mean and standard deviation in between the other two assets. It is apparent
that the Sharpe ratio of aggregate housing is much higher than that on stocks.
In principle, we could use the numbers from Table B.2 directly for our benchmark beliefs. How-
ever, this would not capture the tradeo  faced by the typical individual household. Indeed, the
66housing returns in Table B.2 are for the aggregate housing stock, while real estate is typically a
non-diversi ed investment. It is implausible to assume that investors were able to pick a portfolio of
real estate with return characteristics as in Table B.2 at any time over our sample period. Instead,
the typical investor picks real estate by selecting a few properties local markets.
Existing evidence suggests that the volatility of house returns at the metro area, and even at
the neighborhood or property level are signi cantly higher than returns at the national aggregate.
For example, Caplin et al. (1997) argue that 1/4 of the overall volatility is aggregate, 1/4 is city-
component, and 1/2 is idiosyncratic. Tables 1A and 1B in Flavin and Yamashita (2002) together with
Appendix C in Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) con rm this decomposition of housing returns.
As a simple way to capture this higher property-level volatility, we add idiosyncratic shocks to the
variance of housing returns that have volatility equal to 3.5 times aggregate volatility.13 Finally, we
assume that expected future real rents are constant. This ignores the volatility of real rent growth,
w h i c hi ss m a l l ,a ta r o u n d2 %p e ry e a r .
Taxes on investment
Investors care about after-tax real returns. In particular, taxes a ect the relative attractiveness of
equity and real estate. On the one hand, dividends on owner-occupied housing are directly consumed
and hence not taxed, while dividends on stocks are subject to income tax. On the other hand, capital
gains on housing are more easily sheltered from taxes than capital gains on stocks. This is because
many consumers simply live in their house for a long period of time and never realize the capital
gains. Capital gains tax matters especially in in ationary times, because the nominal gain is taxed:
the e ective real after tax return on an asset subject to capital gains tax is therefore lower when
in ation occurs.
To measure the e ect of capital gains taxes, one would ideally like to explicitly distinguish realized
and unrealized capital gains. However, this would involve introducing state variables to keep track
of past individual asset purchase decisions. To keep the problem manageable, we adopt a simpler
approach: we adjust our benchmark returns to capture the e ects described above. For our baseline
set of results, we assume proportional taxes, and we set both the capital gains tax rate and the
13Since the volatility of housing is measured imprecisely, we chose the precise number for the multiplicative factor
such that the aggregate share of housing in the model roughly matches the FFA data. The resulting factor is 3.5, close
to the rule-of-thumb factor of 4.
67income tax rate to 20%. We de ne after tax real stock returns by subtracting 20% from realized net
real stock returns and then further subtracting 20% times the realized rate of in ation to capture
the fact that nominal capital gains are taxed. In contrast, we assume that returns on real estate are
not taxed.
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